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THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: A "HAYSTACK IN A
HURRICANE"
Richard Ausness*
INTRODUCTION
Over the years, entertainers, athletes and other celebrities have
sought legal protection for a variety of occupationally related inju-
ries. By virtue of being in the public eye, celebrities often complain
that their private lives have somehow been invaded. This concept of
invasion of privacy involves damages for mental anguish suffered by
virtue of the unwarranted disturbance. However, performers may
also suffer injury of an economic, rather than personal, nature. For
example, an individual's performance may be used without his or her
consent. People will normally pay to watch that entertainer, but
where the performance is misappropriated, he is unable to reap the
benefits of his talent and capitalize upon the public demand for his
performance.' This economic interest may be referred to as "per-
formance value." The other economic interest important to celebri-
ties, somewhat analogous to a business organization's interest in its
name and goodwill, is "recognition value." As the name implies, this
is derived from the public's recognition of a celebrity's name or like-
ness The celebrity exploits this recognition through endorsements
and other forms of advertising where the goodwill associated with his
persona is transferred to a collateral product, thereby increasing its
acceptance by the public.$ In addition, popular interest in the celeb-
rity creates a market for products such as posters, statues, tee-shirts
Professor of Law, University of Kentucky; B.A., 1966, J.D., 1968 University of Florida;
LL.M. 1973, Yale University.
1. The most important means of protecting performing values is contractual. Generally,
the contract will specify the extent to which rights in the performance are retained by the
performer and the extent to which they are assigned to others. However, although the contract
provides the performer with a remedy against parties to the agreement, it does not protect him
against third parties. Silverberg, Authors' and Performers' Rights, 23 LAw & CONTE1eP.
PROBS. 125 (1958); Comment, The Twilight Zone: Meanderings in the Area of Performers'
Rights, 9 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 819, 819-20 (1962). For this reason, the state must protect the
performer by preventing unauthorized persons from recording, duplicating, broadcasting, or
otherwise disseminating the performance, thereby depriving the performer of the benefits of his
effort. Id. at 820.
2. See also Comment, The Descendibility of the Right of Publicity. Memphis Develop-
ment Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc., 14 GA. L. REV. 831, 841 n.87 (1980). Cf Grant v.
Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 879-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (use of celebrity's picture for pur-
poses of trade held actionable appropriation).
3. Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names. Likenesses and Personal Histories. 51
TEx. L. REV. 637, 644-47 (1973).
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and other memorabilia which carry his name or likeness.4 Like the
performance interest, however, recognition values have little utility
unless the legal order acknowledges the exclusive nature of the ce-
lebrity's interest in his persona by enabling him to prevent others
from exploiting it without his permission.'
In the past, various legal theories, including privacy and unfair
competition, have been invoked to protect performance and recogni-
tion values.' Recently, however, performers and other celebrities
have been utilizing another doctrine known as the right of publicity
to prevent unauthorized exploitation of these interests. According to
this concept, the intangible values generated by the activities of en-
tertainers and celebrities are characterized as a species of property
which can be licensed or assigned to others.7 Within the last two or
three years, courts have decided cases involving such celebrities as
Elvis Presley, Laurel & Hardy, Muhammad Ali, Bela Lugosi,
Agatha Christie and the Marx Brothers.8 Litigation of this nature is
likely to continue as other celebrities, or those claiming through
them, attempt to capitalize on these publicity rights.
Almost three decades ago a federal court in Ettore v. Philco
Television Broadcasting Corp. characterized the state of the law in
the field of publicity rights as a "haystack in a hurricane."' Today,
the law of publicity remains even more unsettled as new controver-
sies have arisen. Perhaps the most significant issue is whether public-
ity rights survive the death of those who create them.10 Another area
of uncertainty is the extent to which publicity rights are preempted
4. Comment, The Right of Publicity: Premature Burial for California Property Rights
in the Wake of Lugosi, 12 PAc. L.J. 987, 1000 (1981).
5. Cf Rader, The "Right of Publicity"-A New Dimension. 61 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 228,
241 (1979).
6. See notes 13-74 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the right of privacy
and the law of unfair competition.
7. See Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
8. See, e.g., Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 955 (1980); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc. (Factors 1), 579 F.2d 215 (2d
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); Groucho Marx Prod's., Inc. v. Day & Night
Co., Inc., 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339
(D.N.J. 1981); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Price v.
Worldvision Enter's., Inc., 455 F. Supp. 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), affd, 603 F.2d 214 (2d Cir.
1979); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Price v. Hal Roach Studios,
Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 160
Cal. Rptr. 323, 603 P.2d 425 (1979).
9. 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956).
10. See generally Felcher & Rubin, The Descendibility of the Right of Publicity: Is
There Commercial Life After Death?, 89 YALE L.J. 1125 (1980).
[Vol. 55
THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
by federal copyright legislation.11 Finally, the impact of the first
amendment on the right of publicity is in need of clarification.1
This article will address each of these matters. Part I examines
the nature and scope of the right of publicity as well as its relation to
privacy and unfair competition. Part II considers whether the right
of publicity should survive death while Part III deals with the fed-
eral preemption issue. Finally, constitutional limitations on the exer-
cise of publicity rights are analyzed in Part IV.
I. PUBLICITY, PRIVACY AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
Until the emergence of the right of publicity, entertainers and
celebrities were forced to rely on the right of privacy or the law of
unfair competition to prevent others from impairing their perform-
ance or recognition values. However, neither of these concepts pro-
vided satisfactory protection for the economic interests at stake."
A. The Right of Privacy
The concept of the right of privacy was first proposed by War-
ren and Brandeis in 1890.14 Today, almost all jurisdictions recognize
some form of privacy interest;1n most have done so by judicial deci-
sion,16 but seven states enacted statutes to protect the right of
11. See generally Shipley, Publicity Never Dies; It Just Fades Away: The Right of Pub-
licity and Federal Preemption, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 673 (1981).
12. See generally Felcher & Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real People
by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577 (1979).
13. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoDs. 203, 203-14 (1954).
14. Warren & Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
15. See generally Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960), for a discussion of the
historical development of the invasion of privacy tort.
16. See, e.g., Smith v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250, 37 So. 2d 118 (1948); Smith v. Suratt, 7
Alaska 416 (1926); Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133 (1945); Olan
Mills, Inc. v. Dodd, 234 Ark. 495, 353 S.W.2d 22 (1962); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285,
297 P. 91 (Dist. Ct. App. 1931); Rugg v. McCarty, 173 Colo. 170, 476 P.2d 753 (1970); Korn
v. Rennison, 21 Conn. Supp. 400, 156 A.2d 476 (Super. Ct. 1959); Barberi v. News-Journal
Co., 56 Del. 67, 189 A.2d 773 (1963); Peay v. Curtis Publishing Co., 78 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C.
1948); Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1944); Pavesich v. New England Life
Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905); Fergerstrom v. Hawaiian Ocean View Estates, 50
Hawaii 374 (1968); Continental Optical Co. v. Reed, 119 Ind. App. 643, 86 N.E.2d 306
(1949); Bremmer v. Journal-Tribune Publishing Co., 247 Iowa 817, 76 N.W.2d 762 (1956);
Kunz v. Allen, 102 Kan. 883, 172 P. 532 (1918); Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W.
867 (1927); Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905); Estate of Berthiaume v.
Pratt, 365 A.2d 792 (Me. 1976); Cart v. Watkins, 227 Md. 578, 177 A.2d 841 (1962); Pallas
v. Crowley, Milner & Co., 322 Mich. 411, 33 N.W.2d 911 (1948); Martin v. Dorton, 210
Miss. 668, 50 So. 2d 391 (1951); Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076 (Ct.
App. 1911); Welsh v. Pritchard, 125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816 (1952); Norman v. City of Las
Vegas, 64 Nev. 38, 177 P.2d 442 (1947); Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d
19821
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privacy.17
According to Dean Prosser, there are four distinct types of inva-
sion of privacy: intrusion upon physical solitude; public disclosure of
private facts; false light in the public eye; and appropriation of name
or likeness.1 8 Intrusion upon the plaintiff's physical solitude or seclu-
sion includes trespasses to land, illegal personal searches, eavesdrop-
ping and other unacceptable forms of prying into another's private
affairs.1 9 Public disclosure of private facts involves the dissemination
of information about a person which although true, is embarrassing
or highly personal.2 0 The facts disclosed must be private ones; mat-
ters of public record or public knowledge, such as criminal convic-
tions, are normally not within the scope of this action."1 False light
privacy actions arise where false information or impressions are
given about the person." While these false impressions need not be
defamatory, they must be offensive to a person of ordinary sensibili-
ties. Consequently, defamation and false light often overlap. Appro-
priation of name or likeness involves the use of a person's name, pic-
ture or photograph in a manner that is likely to be offensive. Use of
the plaintiff's picture in connection with advertising is a common ex-
ample of appropriation,23  although it covers other situations as
239 (1964); Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 72 N.J. Eq. 910, 67 A. 97 (Ct. Err. & App. 1907);
Apodoca v. Miller, 79 N.M. 160, 441 P.2d 200 (1968); Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212
N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938); Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956);
Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 166 Or. 482, 113 P.2d 438 (1941); Clayman v. Bernstein, 38
Pa. D. & C. 543 (C.P., Phila. County 1940); Holloman v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 192 S.C. 454, 7
S.E.2d 169 (1940); Truxes v. Kenco Enter's., Inc., 80 S.D. 104, 119 N.W.2d 914 (1963);
Langford v. Vanderbilt Univ., 199 Tenn. 389, 287 S.W.2d 32 (1956); Billings v. Atkinson, 489
S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1973); Roach v. Harper, 143 W. Va. 869, 105 S.E.2d 564 (1958).
17. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214 § 3A (West
1982); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-52 (McKinney 1976); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 §§ 839.1-.2
(1971 & Supp. 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-9-405-406 (1978); VA. CODE § 8-650 (1965);
WIS. STAT. § 895.50(2)(b) (1981 Supp.).
18. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 802-14 (4th ed. 1971).
19. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); Factors 1. 579
F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d
1205 (8th Cir. 1969); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981).
20. Banks v. King Features Syndicate, 30 F. Supp. 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (X-rays of
woman's pelvic region); Tollefson v. Price, 247 Or. 398, 430 P.2d 990 (1967) (financial
information).
21. See, e.g., Stryker v. Republic Pictures Corp., 108 Cal. App. 2d 191, 238 P.2d 670
(1951) (military service); Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d 606 (1956)
(birth).
22. See Peay v. Curtis Publishing Co., 78 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1948) (plaintiff por-
trayed as dishonest cab driver); Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905) (plain-
tiff's photograph placed in "rogue's gallery").
23. See Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 III. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952) (plaintiff's
picture used to promote sale of dog food); Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195
S.E. 55 (1938) (plaintiff's picture used to advertise vaudeville show); Selsman v. Universal
Photo Books, Inc., 18 A.D.2d 151, 238 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1963) (plaintiff's photograph used in
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well. 4
The appropriation theory'8 has generally been used when celeb-
rities have invoked the law of privacy to protect themselves from un-
authorized exploitation by others. For example, a professional golfer
recovered when the defendant obtained newsreel motion pictures of
him giving an exhibition of trick shots and used them without per-
mission in a movie entitled Golfing Rhythm.' Fred Astaire obtained
injunctive relief against the use of his name and photograph in an
advertisement for "Swank" jewelry.'7 In the same manner an actor
was able to prevent his picture from being used for advertising pur-
poses by the Postal Telegraph Company s and a baseball player also
secured an injunction when his photograph was placed on popcorn
packages without his consent.'
These cases, however, were not common-law privacy actions,
but rather, were brought under the New York Civil Rights Act, a
statute which allows "any person whose name, portrait or picture is
used . . . for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade" to
sue for damages or injunctive relief.30 In a common law privacy ac-
tion, most courts regard injury to personal feelings as the primary
element of damages.3 1 Celebrities and entertainers who have actively
sought publicity cannot honestly claim to be offended by public ex-
posure alone. Consequently, the courts have frequently limited celeb-
rities to nominal damages82 or denied recovery altogether" when
camera manual).
24. See Burns v. Stevens, 236 Mich. 443, 210 N.W. 482 (1926) (posing as plaintiff's
wife); Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 72 N.J. Eq. 910, 67 A. 97 (Ct. Err. & App. 1907) (plaintiff
named as father of child on birth certificate).
25. The term "appropriation" in this article is used in connection with the right of pri-
vacy, while the term "misappropriation" is usually associated with a form of unfair competi-
tion. Missappropriation is discussed infra notes 57-74.
26. Redmond v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 253 A.D. 708, 1 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1937), aj'd,
277 N.Y. 707, 14 N.E.2d 636 (1938).
27. Astaire v. Esquire Magazine, 95 N.Y.L.J., Feb. 11, 1936 at 760:7 (Sup. Ct., New
York County 1936).
28. Sinclair v. Postal Tel. & Cable Co., 72 N.Y.S.2d 841, 842 (Sup. Ct., New York
County 1935).
29. Jansen v. Hilo Packing Co., 202 Misc. 900, 902, 118 N.Y.S.2d 162, 164 (Sup. Ct.,
New York County 1952).
30. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 1976).
31. See, e.g., Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip. Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 82, 86, 291
P.2d 194, 198 (1955); Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 Ill. App. 293, 299, 106 N.E.2d 742,
745 (1952); Kunz v. Allen, 102 Kan. 883, 883-84, 172 P. 532, 532-33 (1918). Professor
Treece, however, is skeptical about the idea that ordinary persons are necessarily offended
when their names or likenesses are used in advertisements. See Treece, note 3 supra, at 640-
41.
32. See, e.g.. Miller v. Madison Square Garden, 176 Misc. 714, 717, 28 N.Y.S.2d 811,
814 (Sup. Ct., New York County 1941) (judgment for six cents); Fisher v. Murray M. Rosen-
berg, Inc., 175 Misc. 370, 372, 23 N.Y.S.2d 677, 679 (Sup. Ct., New York County 1940)
1982]
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they have merely sought to vindicate economic interests and failed to
show mental distress. Thus, the plaintiff in Gautier v. Pro-Football,
Inc.34 was denied relief when a television network broadcasted an
animal act performed by the plaintiff during half-time ceremonies at
a Washington Redskin football game. 5 The court declared that "the
recovery is grounded on the mental strain and distress, on the humil-
iation, and on the disturbance of the peace of mind suffered by the
individual affected." ' Perhaps the plaintiff would have recovered if
he had eschewed the privacy claim and sued on the basis that his
contract did not allow a telecasting of his performance.
37
Recovery was also denied in O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co."
O'Brien, a well-known college quarterback, was chosen as a member
of Collier Magazine's All-American Football Team in 1938. Al-
though he had allowed his picture to be used in sports journals and
similar media, O'Brien objected when the defendant published a pro-
motional calendar which carried his picture along with those of other
All-Americans. Having sought publicity, the court reasoned, the
plaintiff could hardly be offended by Pabst's actions.39 As in Gautier,
the Fifth Circuit refused to use the right of privacy as a vehicle for
redressing economic injury, rather than mental distress.40 These
cases suggest that the right of privacy does not protect those eco-
nomic interests covered by the right of publicity.
There are other aspects of the right of privacy that make it an
unsuitable vehicle for protecting the economic interests of entertain-
ers and celebrities. First, because the interest protected is a personal
one, the right of privacy cannot be assigned.' Thus, although an
individual can release another from liability, he cannot grant an ex-
($300 compensatory damages awarded). But see Redmond v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 253
A.D. 708, 1 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1937), aff'd, 277 N.Y. 707, 14 N.E.2d 636 (1938) (trial court
judgment of six cents increased to $1500).
33. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1942); Gautier v. Pro-
Football, Inc., 278 A.D. 431, 106 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1951), a f/d, 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485
(1952).
34. 278 A.D. 431, 106 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1951), a-'d, 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485
(1952).
35. 278 A.D. at 439, 106 N.Y.S.2d at 561.
36. Id. at 438, 106 N.Y.S.2d at 560.
37. Id. at 439, 106 N.Y.S.2d at 561.
38. 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1942).
39. Id. at 170.
40. Id. Cf. Sharman v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 401, 405 (ED. Pa. 1963)
(professional basketball player who posed for pictures for advertising purposes could not re-
cover under invasion of privacy when one of these pictures was used to promote beer).
41. See Hanna Mfg. Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 78 F.2d 763, 766 (5th Cir. 1935).
See also Comment, Privacy, Appropriation and the First Amendment: A Human Can-
nonball's Rather Rough Landing, 1977 B.Y.U.L. REV. 579, 585.
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clusive right to make commercial use of his name or likeness which
is enforceable under a privacy theory." In addition, an action for
invasion of privacy, like defamation, can only be maintained by a
living person.43 The cause of action will not survive death because
the gist of a privacy action is injury to hurt feelings-something
manifestly inapplicable to a dead person.
B. Unfair Competition
Unfair competition embraces a wide variety of objectionable
business practices." It evolved as an equitable principle to provide
relief wherever, by reason of an unjustifiable act, the goods of the
defendant were accepted by purchasers as those of the plaintiff.4"
This facet of unfair competition, known as "passing off," requires
public deception.4a Another theory of unfair competition is "misap-
propriation," under which liability will attach where the defendant
appropriates for commercial advantage a benefit arising from the ef-
forts of another.' Therefore, passing off focuses upon the injury to
the public,48 while misappropriation emphasizes the pecuniary loss
sustained by the plaintiff." One feature they have in common, how-
ever, is a requirement that some form of competition exist between
the plaintiff and the defendant. Generally speaking, the courts have
taken a liberal view of what constitutes competition, " and have al-
42. See Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868-69
(2d Cir. 1953) (exclusive right for commercial use derived from statute). See also Nimmer,
note 13 supra, at 209.
43. See, e.g., Young v. That Was The Week That Was, 423 F.2d 265, 265-66 (6th Cir.
1970); Hendrickson v. California Newspapers, Inc., 48 Cal. App. 3d 59, 62, 121 Cal. Rptr.
429, 431 (Ct. App. 1975); Kelly v. Johnson Publishing Co., 160 Cal. App. 2d 718, 325 P.2d
659, 661-62 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958). See also Comment, 15 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 181, 184
(1981).
44. See Comment, The Misappropriation Doctrine After the Copyright Revision Act of
1976, 81 DICK. L. REV. 469, 475 n.50 (1977).
45. Solinger, Unauthorized Use of Telecasts, 48 COLUM. L. REv. 848, 859 (1948).
46. See Comment, note I supra, at 841.
47. Hodgson, Intellectual Property-Performer's Style---A Quest for Ascertainment,
Recognition and Protection, 52 DEN. L.J. 561, 585 (1975); Aherens, The Misappropriation
Doctrine After Sears-Compco, 2 U.S.F.L. REV. 292, 295 (1968).
48. Note, 26 IOWA L. REV. 384 (1941).
49. Comment, note I supra, at 842-43.
50. But see Vassar College v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., 197 F. 982 (W.D. Mo. 1912) (no
competition between Vassar College and defendant company which sold "Vassar Choco-
lates"-seal on candy boxes closely resembled the seal of Vassar College; also, boxes pictured
a lady wearing a mortar-board). See also Smith v. Suratt, 7 Alaska Rep. 416 (1926) (court
refused to enjoin defendant news service from taking unauthorized photographs of plaintifrs
expedition to North Pole because it was "heroic adventure," not commercial undertaking).
19821
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lowed indirect competition to suffice.61
When there is deception, the passing off theory of unfair compe-
tition may be successfully employed to protect entertainers and ce-
lebrities. For example, in Chaplin v. Amador,51 comedian Charlie
Chaplin enjoined another actor from imitating his name, dress and
performing style in a movie called The Race Track. The court found
that the defendant's impersonation was calculated to deceive the
public and work a fraud upon both the public and the plaintiff.8 S
Comedian Bert Lahr also recovered where a "Lestoil" television
commercial featured an animated cartoon duck which imitated his
distinctive voice." The defendant's actions not only deceived the
public into thinking that Lahr had done the commercial, but also
reduced the potential market for his services from other commercial
advertisers.' 6 On the other hand, singer Nancy Sinatra was unable to
prevent Goodyear from using the lyrics to These Boots Are Made
for Walkin' in a television commercial for its tires since the court
did not believe that the public would be deceived into thinking the
vocalist in the commercial was Sinatra even though their singing
styles were similar.6 6 Thus, the passing off doctrine falls short of pro-
51. Indirect competition exists when the defendant commercially exploits the plaintiff's
performance in a different manner than that employed by the performer. For example, in
Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d
483 (Sup. Ct., New York County 1950), aft'd, 279 A.D. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (App. Div.
1951), the defendant record company recorded the plaintiff's live performance off the air and
sold phonograph records of the performances. The opera association was a performer, while
the defendant was a record manufacturer and, therefore, they were not in direct competition
with each other. Nevertheless, the court granted an injunction against the defendant, declaring
that "persons in theoretically non-competitive fields may, by unethical business practices, in-
flict as severe and reprehensible injuries upon others as can direct competitors." 199 Misc. at
796, 101 N.Y.S.2d at 492. Courts, however, have occasionally refused to find liability in cases
where the plaintiff was not trying to exploit his identity or talent for economic gain. Thus, in
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. De Costa, 377 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 1007 (1968), the plaintiff, who claimed that he had originated the "Paladin" character,
was unable to recover under the unfair competition theory because he did not copyright the
Paladin name, dress, slogan, or chess piece symbol or use them for commercial purposes. Id. at
321.
52. 93 Cal. App. 358, 269 P. 544 (Dist. Ct. App. 1928).
53. Id. at 363, 269 P. at 546.
54. Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256, 259 (1st Cir. 1962).
55. Id. See also Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 396
N.Y.S.2d 661 (1977), in which the defendant during a television commercial used an actor
conducting an orchestra and provided him with the same gestures, musical beat, and music
(Auld Lang Syne) with which Guy Lombardo had been associated in the public's mind for
several decades. Recovery was allowed under the passing off theory of unfair competition. 58
A.D.2d at 624, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 665 (Hopkins, J., concurring).
56. Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 716 (9th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971). The same result was alsb reached in Davis v. Trans World
Airlines, 297 F. Supp. 1145 (C.D. Cal. 1969), where TWA used the song Up. Up and Away in
its commercials. Members of "The Fifth Dimension," which had first recorded the song, sued
[Vol. 55
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tecting publicity interests to the extent that public deception is re-
quired in order to recover.
The misappropriation theory originated in International News
Service v. Associated Press, 7 decided by the United States Supreme
Court in 1918. International News Service (INS) obtained news
items from Associated Press' (AP) bulletin boards and from wire
stories published in eastern newspapers; it then transmitted them to
subscribers in the West who were thereby enabled to publish those
stories before the plaintiff's customers. INS argued that once AP
had published a news item it was placed in the public domain and
could no longer be controlled by the plaintiff. The Court, however,
recognized the existence of a "quasi property" right in AP, good
only against its competitors and based on its expenditures of labor,
skill and money.58 This "property" was protected from misappropria-
tion by a competitor to the extent necessary to give the AP first use
of the news it had gathered in all areas of the syndicate's publica-
tion." Similarly, the misappropriation concept was invoked in Pitts-
burgh Athletic Co. v. KQVOO to protect a baseball club against a
defendant who had broadcast an account of the games based on re-
ports from observers stationed outside the stadium.61 The court held
that the plaintiff had a legitimate right to capitalize on the news
value of its games by selling exclusive broadcasting rights and, con-
sequently, the defendant's attempt to appropriate this value consti-
tuted unfair competition."'
The misappropriation concept has also been invoked by per-
formers and other public figures. For example, in Ettore v. Philco
Television Broadcasting Corp.," a former prizefighter sued a televi-
sion station to recover damages for televising a film of his 1936 fight
under an unfair competition theory. As in the Sinatra case, the defendant had obtained per-
mission to use the song from the composer so that there was no claim "of statutory copyright
infringement. Although Up, Up and Away was associated in the public's mind with The Fifth
Dimension, the court felt that no deception of the public would occur. Id. at 1146; see also
Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (imitation of television
comedy series character).
57. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
58. Id. at 236.
59. Id. at 240. See also Note, Unfair Competition After Sears and Compco. 22 VAND. L.
REv. 129, 131 (1968).
60. 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938).
61. Id. at 492. See also Twentieth Century Sporting Club, Inc., v. Transradio Press
Serv., Inc., 165 Misc. 71, 73-74, 300 N.Y.S. 159, 161-62 (Sup. Ct., New York County 1937)
(injunction granted to broadcaster to prevent competitor from using information from plain-
tifrs radio broadcast of prizefight in defendant's account of the fight).
62. 24 F. Supp. at 492.
63. 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956).
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with Joe Louis on its program Greatest Fights of the Century. At
the time of the fight Ettore had sold the cinema rights, but remained
free to exploit his performance rights through other media such as
television. The lower court's judgment for the defendant was re-
versed on appeal and the case was remanded back to the trial court
for a determination of damages." Relief was presumably available
even though Ettore was no longer boxing professionally and had not
tried to exploit his fight films for commercial purposes.
The misappropriation theory has also been applied where one
has made an unauthorized use of the plaintiff's name or likeness in
connection with merchandising efforts. Thus, in Hirsch v. S. C.
Johnson & Son, Inc.,65 former football player "Crazylegs" Hirsch
recovered against the manufacturer of a womens' shaving gel called
"Crazylegs."" The plaintiff was widely known as "Crazylegs" and
had done commercials under that name.7
There is a strong resemblance between the misappropriation
theory of unfair competition and the right of publicity in that both
concepts are concerned with preventing unjust enrichment", and
both characterize the intangible interest created by a person's talent
or labor as "property."' 9 Nevertheless, the right of publicity is supe-
rior to misappropriation in several respects, at least where perform-
ers and celebrities are concerned. First, the assignee of a celebrity's
right of publicity may enforce his rights against the celebrity him-
self70 or against third parties.7 1 It is not clear whether an assignee
64. Id. at 496. But see Republic Pictures Corp. v. Rogers, 213 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1954),
and Autry v. Republic Prod's, Inc., 213 F.2d 667, 669 (9th Cir. 1954), where the court held
that the performers' motion picture contracts also authorized exploitation through television.
Boxer Jack Sharkey also recovered when films of his fights were shown on Greatest Fights
of the Century. Sharkey sued under New York's invasion of privacy statute. Sharkey v. Na-
tional Broadcasting Co., 93 F. Supp. 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
65. 90 Wis. 2d 379, 280 N.W.2d 129 (1979).
66. Id. at 403, 280 N.W.2d at 140.
67. See also Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Universal Pictures Co., 255 A.D. 459, 464,
7 N.Y.S.2d 845, 850-51 (1938) (defendant's use of Madison Square Garden's name in feature
film about ice hockey held to be a misappropriation).
68. Compare International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239-40 (1918)
(misappropriation theory based on equitable principle that buyer of property entitled to benefi-
cial use), with Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 443 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (right
of publicity seeks to prevent unjust enrichment by theft of good will).
69. Compare International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918)
(under misappropriation theory, news material considered quasi-property), with Factors 1, 579
F.2d 215, 221 (2d Cir. 1978) (right of publicity is valid and transferable property right);
Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205, 1206 (8th Cir. 1969) (right of publicity is valid and
transferable property right); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 844
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (person's name and likeness constitute property rights).
70. See, e.g., Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205, 1207-08 (8th Cir. 1969).
71. See, e.g., Factors 1, 579 F.2d 215, 221 (2d Cir. 1978); Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v.
[Vol. 55
THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
can maintain a cause of action in his own right under the misappro-
priation theory as the law of unfair competition does not usually rec-
ognize an assignment in gross. 2 Assignability, however, is essential
to the commercial value of most publicity rights since they are gen-
erally most useful when licensed or transferred to another for a con-
sideration. 78 Another advantage of publicity rights over misappropri-
ation is the apparent lack of a competition requirement, which has
occasionally been an obstacle to recovery under the misappropriation
theory.74
C. The Right of Publicity
The inadequacies of privacy and the traditional theories of un-
fair competition have led to the development of the right of publicity
as a means of protecting performance and recognition values. This
right of publicity was first recognized in Haelan Laboratories v.
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,7 5 decided in 1953. Topps entered into
contracts with a number of major league baseball players for the
exclusive right to use their photographs to promote the sale of its
chewing gum. Thereafter, another party made similar agreements
with the same players and assigned the rights to the defendant.76
The defendant argued that since the right of privacy was not assign-
able, the contracts were no more than releases from the liability
which would result from unauthorized use of the players' photo-
graphs under the New York privacy statute. Consequently, the de-
fendants maintained that the plaintiff had obtained no property or
other interest which could be invaded. 7 The trial court agreed with
this reasoning and dismissed the complaint.78 On appeal, the Second
Circuit reversed, declaring that celebrities had an assignable prop-
erty interest in the exploitation of their names and identities for
commercial purposes. The court stated:
We think that, in addition to and independent of that right of
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 870 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
72. Nimmer, note 13 supra, at 210.
73. Felcher & Rubin, note 10 supra, at 1127.
74. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. De Costa, 377 F.2d 315, 316 (1st Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1007 (1968).
75. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
76. A detailed discussion of the various contracts involved appears in Haelan Laborato-
ries, Inc., v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 904, 906-10 (E.D.N.Y. 1953) (on
remand).
77. 202 F.2d at 867.
78. 103 F. Supp. 944, 953-54 (E.D.N.Y. 1952).
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privacy (which in New York derives from statute), a man has a
right in the publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to
grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture, and that
such a grant may be validly made "in gross" i.e., without any
accompanying transfer of a business or anything else. . . .This
right may be called a "right of publicity." For it is common
knowledge that many prominent persons (especially actors and
ball-players), far from having their feelings bruised through pub-
lic exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they
no longer received money for authorizing advertisements ...
popularizing their countenances. This right of publicity would
usually yield no money unless it could be made the subject of an
exclusive grant which barred any other advertiser from using
their pictures.
7'
In the years since Haelan Laboratories was decided, the right of
publicity has been recognized by an increasing number of state and
federal courts.80
As mentioned earlier, the right of publicity is more practical
than the privacy theory because it is expressly concerned with pro-
tecting economic interests.8 1 Moreover, unlike the interests covered
by privacy or unfair competition doctrines, publicity rights are capa-
ble of being licensed or assigned to third persons.8 2 Assignability al-
lows a person to grant an exclusive right to another to exploit his
performance or recognition values. Typically, the celebrity will li-
cense another to perform a specific activity. For example, a rock
singer or comedian might permit a film producer to film and record
a particular concert. Recognition values can be exploited in a similar
manner. An athlete might allow one company to place his name on
its sports equipment while also permitting another company to use
his name or picture to promote the same of beer or soft drinks.83
79. 202 F.2d at 868.
80. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); Fac-
tors 1, 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); Cepeda v. Swift &
Co., 415 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J.
1981).
81. Hoffman, Limitations on the Right of Publicity. 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 111,
116 (1980).
82. See Comment, Transfer of the Right of Publicity: Dracula's Progeny and Privacy's
Stepchild, 22 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1103, 1120 (1975).
83. See Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969), which provides an inter-
esting example of a dispute between the celebrity and licensee about the scope of the publicity
rights transferred. In that case, baseball player Orlando Cepeda granted an exclusive license to
Wilson Sporting Goods to use his name and likeness in connection with the sale of sports
equipment. Id. at 1206. Wilson then entered into an arrangement with Swift whereby "Or-
lando Cepeda" baseballs were offered at a special price by Swift to those who sent in a speci-
fied number of hot dog wrappers. Id. This promotion was widely advertised by Swift and
Cepeda's picture was used in the advertisements. Id. The court held that Wilson could validly
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1. Protection of Performance Values
The rationale behind legal recognition of performance values is
similar to that which accounts for the protection accorded authors
and composers under copyright laws. Entertainers, like authors and
composers, produce something of value for society." The develop-
ment of performing skills and the implementation of creative ideas
often requires a substantial investment of time, energy and money.
The greater the possibilities for personal profit, the more likely peo-
ple are to pursue these creative, socially beneficial activities.8 5 For
this reason the right of publicity can arguably be applied to protect
the values that inhere in a particular performance.
The leading case in this area, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co.,86 decided by the United States Supreme Court in
1977, relied on this rationale to uphold the right of performance.
The plaintiff, Hugo Zacchini, performed a "human cannonball" act
at a local fair in which he was shot from a cannon into a net about
200 feet away. Each performance lasted about fifteen seconds.
Zacchini brought suit against the defendants when they filmed the
performance without permission and televised it on the evening news.
Although it characterized Zacchini's interest as a right of publicity,
the Ohio Supreme Court denied recovery on first amendment
grounds.8 7 The United States Supreme Court, however, held that
Zacchini's performance values were entitled to protection. In the
Court's words:
The broadcast of a film of petitioner's entire act poses a substan-
tial threat to the economic value of that performance. As the
Ohio court recognized, this act is the product of petitioner's own
talents and energy, the end result of much time, effort, and ex-
pense. Much of its economic value lies in the "right of exclusive
control over the publicity given to his performance"; if the public
can see the act free on television, it will be less willing to pay to
see it at the fair."
Accordingly, the state court's judgment for the defendant was re-
assign its interest in Cepeda's publicity rights to Swift. Id. at 120. As long as no endorsement
was suggested, Swift was free to use Cepeda's name, likeness, photograph, and signature to
promote the sale of its frankfurters and bacon products. Id. at 1208.
84. Comment, note 1 supra, at 819.
85. Felcher & Rubin, supra note 12, at 1601.
86. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
87. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 351 N.E.2d 454
(1976).
88. 433 U.S. at 575.
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versed and Zacchini's performance rights were upheld."'
It should be noted that a performer may choose to protect a
particular performance through copyright law instead of relying on
the right of publicity. 90 The present federal Copyright Act extends
protection to any original work of authorship fixed in a tangible me-
dium of expression from which it can be perceived, reproduced or
otherwise communicated. 91 Copyright protection for a live perform-
ance, therefore, can easily be secured by videotaping it.9 This pro-
tection arises the moment the work is fixed in a tangible medium of
expression and no formal registration is required.9" Thus, a simple
and inexpensive alternative to protection under state created public-
ity rights is available to performers under the federal Copyright
Act.94
2. Protection of Recognition Values
Publicity values also arise from the goodwill associated with the
name or likeness of a famous person. Like performance values, these
recognition values are usually created by sacrifice and hard work
and, therefore, arguably deserve similar protection. 5 Of course, ce-
lebrity status is not always based on merit; some acquire fame by
fortuitous involvement in a famous event, while others achieve it be-
cause of criminal or antisocial acts." Moreover, while society bene-
fits directly from the performances of talented persons, it derives no
particular benefit from the commercial exploitation of their recogni-
tion values.97 On the other hand, protection of recognition values in-
creases the financial rewards to those who choose publicity generat-
89. For a discussion of the first amendments aspect of the Zacchini decision, see notes
309-25 infra and accompanying text.
90. The interrelationship between copyright and the right of publicity is discussed at
notes 236-74 infra and accompanying text.
91. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp. V 1981).
92. The copyright statute expressly protects works of authorship fixed in such media as
motion pictures, audiovisual works, and sound recordings. Id. § 102(a)(6),(7).
93. The copyright owner, however, may voluntarily obtain registration of the copyright
claim with the United States Copyright Office. Id. §§ 408-410.
94. Zacchini's performance, for example, would probably qualify for copyright protection
as a pantomine or dance. See id. § 102(a)(4). It could be "fixed" by film or possibly in a
system of notation. See id. § 101.
95. Treece, note 3 supra, at 647.
96. See Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 959 (6th Cir. 1980).
97. Hoffman, note 81 supra, at 118. According to Hoffman, celebrities are already com-
pensated for the activities that generate their publicity values. To the extent this compensation
provides them with an adequate rate of return on the time and effort they have invested, less
weight need be accorded to their individual interests in reaping additional remuneration for
collateral uses of their names and likenesses. Id. at 119-20.
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ing careers, and thereby indirectly encourages the production of
creative works and noteworthy achievements. Moreover, the ration-
ale underlying the law of unfair competition-to prevent deception
and unjust enrichment-supports the protection of recognition val-
ues. Advertisements that use a person's photograph or testimonial
without his consent to recommend a product not only victimize the
individual but also harm the consuming public because an unauthor-
ized endorsement is essentially a false claim about the product.' 8
Even where no deception of the public is involved, protection of rec-
ognition values prevents unjust enrichment.9 The unauthorized user
who "reaps where [he] has not sown"100 profits without sharing in
the cost of generating the identity values he seeks to exploit and is
thereby enabled to compete unfairly with authorized licensees of the
celebrity.10 1 Therefore, the right of publicity protects against unau-
thorized use of the celebrity's name and "likeness" for commercial
purposes. The latter category includes drawings, photographs, stat-
ues and other representations.
There are no decisions explicitly applying the right of publicity
to prevent the unauthorized use of a celebrity's name for commercial
purposes. The Hirsch case,1 02 however, supports the proposition that
one's name is an aspect of one's identity entitled to protection under
the publicity concept.108 Cases involving celebrities' likenesses, on
the other hand, have been plentiful. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative
Card Co.104 and AU v. Playgirl, Inc.10 are two of the more signifi-
cant decisions.
In Factors, the plaintiff, who claimed an exclusive right to mar-
ket merchandise bearing the name and likeness of Elvis Presley,. sued
to prevent the defendant from selling posters which featured photo-
graphs of the singer. In holding for the plaintiff, the court distin-
98. Felcher & Rubin, note 12 supra, at 1600.
99. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977). See
also Note, Human Cannonballs and the First Amendment: Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 30 STAN. L. Rav. 1185, 1190 (1978).
100. See International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918).
101. Hoffman, note 81 supra, at 119.
102. Hirsch v. S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 280 N.W.2d 129 (1979),
discussed at notes 65-67 supra and accompanying text.
103. Cf Uproar Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 358 (D. Mass. 1934)
(Graham McNamee); Von Thodorovich v. Franz Joseph Beneficial Ass'n, 154 F. Supp. 911
(E.D. Pa. 1907) (Emperor Franz Josef of Austria-Hungary); Edison v. Edison Polyform Mfg.
Co., 73 N.J. Eq. 136, 67 A. 392 (N.J. 1907) (Thomas Edison); Orsini v. Eastern Wine Corp.,
190 Misc. 235, 73 N.Y.S.2d 426 (Sup. Ct., New York County 1947), a fd, 273 A.D. 947, 78
N.Y.S.2d 224 (1948) (Prince Orsini).
104. 444 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
105. 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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guished the right of publicity from the traditional invasion of privacy
action, emphasizing that commercial exploitation was the interest
protected under the publicity concept. 1 A similar result was
reached in Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., (Factors 1),107 a com-
panion case, which also involved Elvis Presley posters.
In All, professional boxer Muhammad Ali obtained injunctive
relief and damages against Playgirl Magazine when it published a
drawing of a nude black man seated in the corner of a boxing ring.
The picture was accompanied by some doggerel verse. The federal
district court determined that the public would recognize the figure
depicted in Playgirl as Ali and that Playgirl's action encroached
upon his right of publicity.108
The publicity theory has also been extended to impersonations
of entertainers and imitations of their "acts" or performances. The
impersonation cases involve elements of both performance rights and
recognition rights. In many instances the defendant closely imitates
the plaintiff's actual performance, simulating gestures, costume,
voice, and other aspects of his performing style. At the same time,
impersonation goes beyond mere imitation. The defendant is not
merely appropriating an idea, but he is also trying to evoke the
plaintiff's identity. In effect, he attempts to capitalize on the good-
will and public interest in the plaintiff. In that sense, impersonation
resembles other appropriations of recognition values. Where the im-
personation is deceptive, as in Chaplin v. Amador,109 the plaintiff
can recover under the traditional theory of unfair competition. How-
ever, where the public is not deceived, as in the case of imperson-
ations of entertainers who are deceased, recovery may still be al-
lowed under the publicity theory even though it may have been
denied under unfair competition. For example, in Price v. Worldvi-
sion Enterprises, Inc.,110 the widows of comedians Stan Laurel and
Oliver Hardy sought to enjoin the production and distribution of a
television series entitled Stan 'n Ollie, in which two actors portrayed
the Laurel and Hardy characters. According to the court, the com-
mercial nature of the interest claimed by the plaintiffs was distin-
guishable from the interest protected under the concept of privacy
106. 444 F. Supp. at 283.
107. 444 F. Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affid. 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied.
440 U.S. 908 (1979).
108. 447 F. Supp. at 728-29.
109. 93 Cal. App. 358, 269 P. 544 (Ct. App. 1928). For a discussion of the Chaplin case,
see notes 52-53 supra and accompanying text.
110. 455 F. Supp. 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), affd, 603 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1979).
[Vol. 55
THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
and instead was more appropriately characterized as a property in-
terest.11 Therefore, like other forms of property, the right of public-
ity could be assigned and would survive the death of the celebrity. 2
The court granted the injunction to prevent "the impersonation of
their physical likenesses or appearances, costumes and mannerisms,
and/or the simulation of their voices.9
1 13
In a similar case, Estate of Presley v. Russen,"' the defendant
was enjoined from staging an impersonation of Elvis Presley.115 The
stage production, called The Big El Show, featured a performer who
wore the same style of clothing and jewelry as Presley, sang songs
made popular by Presley, wore a similar hair style and imitated
Presley's singing voice, distinctive poses and body movements.""
Even more recently, another court declared the Broadway show, A
Day in Hollywood/A Night in the Ukraine to be an unauthorized
appropriation of characters created by the Marx Brothers. 1 In the
second half of the show, three performers enacted a Marx Brothers-
like farce dressed as Groucho, Harpo and Chico, simulating their
style and mannerisms.
The right of publicity has also been extended to symbols or ob-
jects closely identified with the plaintiff. For example, in Mot-
schenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,1 the defendant's televi-
sion commercial for Winston Cigarettes, featured a race car
resembling Lothar Motschenbacher's distinctive vehicle. A federal
court, anticipating California law, recognized the plaintiff's proprie-
tary interest in this aspect of his identity. 9
Finally, recovery for the right of publicity has been successful
when the defendant has benefitted from commercial use of biograph-
ical information about celebrities.120 For example, in Palmer v.
I I. Id. at 257.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 256.
114. 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981).
115. Id. at 1361.
116. Id. at 1348. Courts, however, are less likely to impose liability when only the enter-
tainer's performing "style" is imitated. Thus, bandleader, Artie Shaw, was unable to prevent
Time-Life Records from using his arrangements of "Swing Era" tunes. Shaw did not own the
copyrights to the underlying musical compositions, and the court held that he did not have any
property interest in his "sound" or musical style. Shaw v. Time-Life Records, 38 N.Y.2d 201,
205, 341 N.E.2d 817, 820, 379 N.Y.S.2d 390, 394 (1975). Accord Miller v. Universal Pictures
Co., Inc., II A.D.2d 47, 201 N.Y.S.2d 632, aff'd. 10 N.Y.2d 972, 180 N.E.2d 248, 224
N.Y.S.2d 662 (1961).
117. Groucho Marx Prod's v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
118. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
119. Id. at 827.
120. Comment,. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Company; Media Appropria-
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Schonhorn Enterprises, Inc.,1"' several professional golfers sued the
manufacturer of a "Pro-Am Golf Game." Inside the game box on
each of twenty-three sheets of paper titled "Profile and Playing
Chart," appeared the name of a golfer along with a short biography.
Although the defendant did not use the plaintiffs' names or like-
nesses on the outside of game cartons or in advertisements, the golf-
ers successfully enjoined the sale of the games.12'
Uhlaender v. Henricksen123 is a similar case. Ted Uhlaender
sued on behalf of himself and other major league baseball players to
prevent the defendant from using their names, statistics and team
affiliations in connection with its table baseball game. It was agreed
by everyone that the interest involved was solely economic. The
plaintiff declared that the Baseball Players' Association had issued
twenty-seven licensing contracts, including four or five to game man-
ufacturers, allowing them to use player information. These contracts
generated more than $400,000 a year for the players.12 ' Acknowl-
edging that the information the defendant used was readily available
in newspapers the court nevertheless concluded that use of this data
in a commercial enterprise constituted a misappropriation of the
players' identity interest.12 5
II. THE SURVIVABILITY ISSUE
Although the concept of publicity rights, as an alternative the-
ory to privacy and unfair competition, has received increasing judi-
cial acceptance during the past decade, the controversy over whether
such rights can survive after death continues to rage unabated. The
stakes involved could be enormous. If the right of publicity survives
death, the heirs or assignees of such deceased celebrities as Elvis
Presley or John Lennon will receive millions of dollars. If the right of
publicity does not survive death, the commercial value of their
names and likenesses will be potentially exploitable by anyone. At
tion, the First Amendment and State Regulation, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 817, 820.
121. 96 N.J. Super. 72, 232 A.2d 458 (Ch. Div. 1967).
122. Id. at 79-80, 232 A.2d at 462.
123. 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970).
124. Id. at 1279.
125. 316 F. Supp. at 1282-83. A similar result was reached in Rosemont Enter's, Inc. v.
Urban Sys's, Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 788, 340 N.Y.S.2d 144, affd as modified, 42 A.D.2d 544, 345
N.Y.S.2d 17 (1973), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979), where the defendant marketed "The
Howard Hughes Game." The court concluded that the Howard Hughes name was improperly
used to advertise and attract attention to the game. 72 Misc. 2d at 790-91, 340 N.Y.S.2d at
146-47.
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the present time post mortem exercise of publicity rights has been
approved by federal courts in New York 2 ' and New Jersey"2 " and
by the Georgia Supreme Court" but rejected by the Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit'29 and the California courts. 30 So far all
of these cases have involved recognition values, which is no doubt a
result of the fact that live performances can only survive the death of
an entertainer if they are filmed or recorded and as such fall within
the purview of federal copyright law.' 3 '
A. Property, Privacy and Defamation Analogies
The courts have often relied on analogies to support their con-
clusions on the survivability issue. Thus, courts which have upheld
the post mortem exercise of publicity rights have frequently empha-
sized the similarity between such rights and other forms of inherita-
ble property. Courts which have determined that the right of public-
ity should terminate at death have likened it to either privacy or
defamation.
The property analogy supports the notion of a survivable right
of publicity in the following manner: under the prevailing view pub-
licity rights are considered to be assignable forms of property. "'
Thus, exploitable rights in a performance or persona can exist inde-
pendently of their creators, just as a copyright interest in a written
work can be severed from a proprietary interest in the underlying
manuscript. Consequently, one can argue that publicity rights, at
least when assigned, are not dependent for their existence on
whether the performer or celebrity who created them is dead or
126. Factors 1, 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979), Groucho
Marx Prod's, Inc. v. Day & Night Co., Inc., 423 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Price v.
Worldvision Enter's, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Price v. Hal Roach Studios,
Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
127. Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981).
128. Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage
Prod's, 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982).
129. Memphis Dev. Corp. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 953 (1981).
130. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 603 P.2d 425
(1979).
131. For a discussion of the applicability of federal copyright law to performance, see
notes 251-54 infra and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., Factors 1, 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979);
Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969); Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953); Groucho
Marx Prod's, Inc. v. Day & Night Co., Inc., 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See also
Note, The Right of Publicity-Protection for Public Figures and Celebrities, 42 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 527, 533 (1976).
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alive.
The property analogy was utilized in Factors 1,13 a case which
involved the publicity rights of singer Elvis Presley. Before his death,
Presley assigned his publicity rights to Boxcar, a corporation con-
trolled by him and his manager.3 Shortly after Presley's death,
133. 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
134. Elvis Presley died on August 16, 1977 at the age of 42. During his life, his profes-
sional career and the commercial exploitation of his persona were managed exclusively by his
friend and mentor, Colonel Tom Parker. As early as 1956, Presley and Parker entered into an
agreement with Special Projects, Inc., a merchandising company. Special Projects was made
"exclusive agent" to license other firms in connection with the sale, marketing, and exploita-
tion of consumer items. Thereafter, all manner of merchandise was covered by numerous li-
censing agreements with sublicensees. See Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339,
1345-46 (D.N.J. 1981).
In 1974, Parker and Presley transferred all of these commercial rights to Boxcar, Inc., a
Tennessee corporation, which thereafter was the exclusive entity through which these rights
were marketed. Boxcar sublicensed other companies to do the actual manufacturing and dis-
tributing of each specific item, receiving royalties from the sales. On August 18, 1977, two
days after Presley's death, Boxcar granted Factors Etc. an exclusive license for 18 months,
renewable at the licensee's option for up to four years, to use Presley's name and likeness in
connection with the manufacture and sale of any kind of merchandise. Factors agreed to pay a
royalty of five percent of sales, subject to a minimum royalty for the first 18 months of
$150,000. Id. at 1346.
About four months after the decision in Memphis Development, 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.
1980), cert. denied. 449 U.S. 953 (1981), Factors moved for summary judgment, seeking a
permanent injunction against Pro Arts in a federal district court. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro
Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (Factors II). The district court rejected the
reasoning of the Memphis Development decision and reaffirmed its earlier conclusion that the
right of publicity claimed by Factors was descendible. Id. at 1104. The district court also
rejected the argument by Pro Arts that Factors was collaterally estopped by Memphis Devel-
opment from asserting a claim against it based on a descendible right of publicity. Id. at 1094.
Accordingly, the court permanently enjoined Pro Arts from marketing the "IN MEMORY"
poster or other Presley memorabilia. Id. at 1104. This decision, however, was reversed on
appeal by the circuit court. Factors 11, 652 F.2d 278, 284 (2d Cir. 1981).
The circuit court noted that, in the exercise of its diversity jurisdiction, the district court
was obliged to apply the substantive law of the state to which the forum state, New York,
would have turned had the suit been filed in state court. Id. at 280. The court agreed with the
defendant's conclusion that Tennessee law should apply since Tennessee was where Presley
was domiciled, where Boxcar was incorporated, and where the agreement between Boxcar and
Factors was made. Id. at 281. Moreover, the Boxcar-Factors agreement had specifically pro-
vided that it was to be construed in accordance with Tennessee law. Acknowledging that there
was no Tennessee law on point, the court, nevertheless, concluded that it should defer to the
Sixth Circuit's reasoning in Memphis Development. d. at 283. Accordingly, the decision of
the district court in favor of Factors was reversed. Id. at 283-84. Ironically, shortly after the
Factors !H decision, a Tennessee trial court held that publicity rights were descendible. In
Commerce Union Bank v. Coors of the Cumberland, Inc., 551 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPY-
RIGHT J. (BNA) A-3 (Ch. Ct. Oct. 22, 1981), the executors of the late Lester Flatt brought
suit for damages and injunctive relief against Coors, which had distributed posters depicting
bluegrass musicians, Flatt and Scruggs, as part of its marketing campaign to promote Coors
beer. The court refused to dismiss the suit, holding that the right of publicity was descendible
in Tennessee. Id. The court rejected the reasoning in Memphis Development and, instead,
cited Factors I with approval. Id.
Upon remand to the district court, the plaintiffs in Factors 11 called to the trial judge's
attention the Commerce Union Bank decision which held for the descendibility of publicity
rights under Tennessee law. The district court stayed entry of judgment for the defendants to
allow the plaintiffs to petition the circuit court for rehearing. The Court of Appeals for the
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Boxcar transferred to Factors the exclusive right to produce and sell
Presley posters and other products. Factors sued to vindicate this
right when a competitor began marketing its own Elvis Presley pos-
ters. The defendant, Pro Arts, had purchased the copyright to a pho-
tograph of Presley taken by a staff photographer of the Atlanta
Journal. The offending poster, which appeared three days after Pres-
ley's death, was entitled "IN MEMORY" and bore the photograph
of Presley along with the dates "1935-1977." A federal district court
in New York where the suit was brought, concluded that Factors'
rights were protected by a transferable and descendible right of
publicity in that state and accordingly granted a preliminary
injunction. 185
On appeal, the circuit court upheld the lower court judgment,"8
relying heavily on Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc.1 7 In Hal Roach,
a federal court upheld the claims of the widows of comedians Stan
Laurel and Oliver Hardy who had granted to the plaintiff corpora-
tion the right to use the names and likenesses of their late husbands.
The defendant, Hal Roach Studios, which held the copyrights to the
Laurel and Hardy movies, was enjoined from infringing upon their
rights to license others to sell Laurel and Hardy memorabilia. 88 The
court in Hal Roach held that the deaths of the actors did not ex-
tinguish the right of publicity assigned to the grantee.1 9
The circuit court in Factors I also rejected the notion that the
right of publicity was merely a variant of the right or privacy, and
therefore, should not survive death. According to the court, privacy
and publicity were concerned with protecting two entirely different
interests: the right of privacy protected a dignitary interest while the
right of publicity was concerned with a pecuniary interest.140 Since
the rationale behind the common law right of privacy and the statute
Second Circuit denied plaintiffs' petition for the rehearing, citing another case, Lancaster v.
Factors, Etc., Inc., 9 MEDIA L. RPTR. (BNA) 1109 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1982) which, unlike
Commerce Union Bank, held that Tennessee law does not recognize a descendible right of
publicity. Factors Etc., Inc. v, Pro. Arts, Inc. (Factors Iil), 701 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1983). Not-
ing that both Lancaster and Commerce Union Bank were decided by the chancery court and,
therefore, were entitled to equal weight, Justice Newman, writing for the majority, concluded
that there was no basis for considering that Tennessee law on the subject had changed since its
prior decision. Factors I11, 701 F.2d at 12.
135. Factors 1, 444 F. Supp. 288, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
136. Factors 1, 579 F.2d 215, 219 (2d Cir. 1978).
137. 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
138. Id. at 847.
139. Id. at 844.
140. 579 F.2d at 220. See also Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S.
562, 576 (1977) (right of publicity provides economic incentive); Kalven, Privacy in Tort
Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 326, 331 (1966).
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which codified the right of privacy in New York 41 was to prevent
injury to feelings, death was a logical cut-off point to any such claim.
This was not the case, according to the court, when purely commer-
cial interests were involved. As the court noted, Elvis Presley had
assigned to Boxcar a valid property right-the exclusive authority to
print, publish and distribute his name and likeness. In return, he was
given the right to receive a certain percentage of the royalties which
would be realized by Boxcar from its licensees as Presley's recogni-
tion values were exploited. 4 2 The court reasoned that since Presley's
publicity rights could be severed and transferred to Boxcar, the exis-
tence of these rights should not depend on whether he was alive.1 43
The death of Presley, who was merely the beneficiary of an income
interest in Boxcar's exclusive right, should not in itself extinguish
Boxcar's property right. Instead, the court declared, the income in-
terest, continually produced from Boxcar's exclusive right of com-
mercial exploitation, should inure to Presley's estate like any other
tangible property interest.1
44
The court's reasoning in Factors I is not entirely convincing. It
presupposes that a property interest which is transferrable is there-
fore automatically survivable. This, of course, is not correct as a gen-
eral proposition. The holder of a life estate, for example, cannot con-
vey more than an estate pur autre vie; when the grantor dies, the
grantee's interest is extinguished.1 45 Thus, the fact that publicity
rights are assignable during life does not inevitably lead to the con-
clusion that they are, or should be, survivable. The Factors court,
having correctly determined that publicity rights were commercial
rather than personal in nature, should have upheld the plaintiff's
claim on the basis that survivability was essential to the marketabil-
ity of publicity rights. That is, in order for a celebrity to gain any
economic benefit from his right to control, license or assign his pub-
licity rights, they must be capable of surviving the death of the
celebrity.
In contrast to Factors L some courts have refused to recognize
the right of publicity as an independent concept, but instead have
141. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-52 (Consol. 1982).
142. 579 F.2d at 217 n.3.
143. Id. at 221.
144. Id. at 221-22.
145. Turner v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 130 Mo. App. 535, 539, 109 S.W. 101, 102
(1908); Murphy v. Van Huesen, 4 Cow. 325, 328 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1825); J. CRIBBET, PRINCI-
PLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 51 (1962); 2 R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, 201
(1981).
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characterized it as an aspect of the right of privacy. 14" According to
this position, the plaintiff's true injury, whether he is a private per-
son or a celebrity, is the loss of his right to control the use of his
identity. Legal recognition of this dignitary interest gives rise to a
right to demand a price for abandoning one's privacy. 4 When the
plaintiff's identity values are wrongfully appropriated, the use to
which the name or likeness is put is less significant than the loss of
freedom to choose whether his persona will be used in a certain
way. 148 It follows, however, that if the interest protected is a per-
sonal one, like other forms of privacy, no cause of action should be
allowed after the plaintiff's death. This view was adopted by the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures,49 when it
refused to recognize a descendible right of publicity. Lugosi involved
a suit by the son and widow of actor Bela Lugosi to recover damages
against Universal Pictures which had licensed the use of the Count
Dracula character for purposes of commercial exploitation. Lugosi,
of course, played the celebrated Transylvanian bloodsucker in the
1930 film Dracula. Both parties agreed that the Dracula character,
created by Bram Stoker, was in the public domain. However, the
plaintiffs contended that the likeness of Lugosi in his role as Dracula
was well-recognized by the public and should be included within the
concept of publicity. The trial court, relying on the property analogy,
held that Lugosi's right to exploit his persona descended to his
heirs.15 0 This decision was reversed by the intermediate appellate
court' 58 and the appellate court's decision was affirmed by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court.8 2 The supreme court, while conceding that
Lugosi might have been able to develop a protectible interest in the
Dracula portrayal during his lifetime, refused to classify the interest
as a descendible one. In the court's opinion recognition values such
as those at stake in Lugosi could only be protected under the concept
of privacy and, therefore, could not survive Bela Lugosi's death. 5 3
146. See, e.g., Maritote v. Desilu Prod's, Inc., 345 F.2d 418, 420 (7th Cir.), cert. denied
382 U.S. 883 (1965); O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1942); Man v.
Warner Bros., Inc., 317 F. Supp. 50, 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
147. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39
N.Y.U.L. REV. 962, 989 (1964).
148. Note, The Human Cannonball and the Press, 38 LA. L. REV. 619, 621-22 (1978).
149. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 603 P.2d 425 (1979).
150. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 541 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Ange-
les County 1972). The trial court opinion is discussed in Comment, note 82 supra, at 1113-17.
151. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 70 Cal. App. 3d 552, modified on denial of rehearing,
139 Cal. Rptr. 35 (1977), af'd, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
152. Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 160 Cal. Rptr., 323, 603 P.2d 425 (1979).
153. Id. at 819, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 326, 603 P.2d at 428.
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The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit also refused to rec-
ognize a post mortem right of publicity in Memphis Development
Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc.,' " another decision which involved
the publicity rights of Elvis Presley. In this case, however, defama-
tion rather than privacy, provided the analogy. The Memphis Devel-
opment Foundation, a nonprofit corporation, desired to erect a
bronze statue of Presley in downtown Memphis. To finance the esti-
mated $200,000 cost of the project, the Foundation proposed to give
eight-inch pewter replicas of the bronze statue to each person who
contributed twenty-five dollars or more toward the project. When
Factors objected to this scheme, the Foundation brought suit to en-
join Factors from interfering with the Foundation's fundraising ef-
forts. 55 Factors counterclaimed for an injunction to prohibit distri-
bution of the pewter statuettes.
As in the previous Factors I litigation, the issue centered around
whether the right of publicity and Factors' rights as assignee sur-
vived the death of Elvis Presley. The district court, applying Tennes-
see law, rejected the Foundation's contention that the right of pub-
licity was nothing more than a branch of privacy, holding that a
descendible right of publicity existed in that state, and enjoined the
Foundation from marketing the pewter statuettes.'" On appeal, the
Sixth Circuit declared that it would review the question "in the light
of practical and policy considerations, the treatment of other similar
rights in our legal system, the relative weight of the conflicting inter-
ests of the parties, and certain moral presuppositions concerning
death, privacy, inheritability and economic opportunity." 17 The
court observed that the law of defamation, which was designed to
protect against the destruction of reputation, including the loss of
earning capacity associated with it, provided an appropriate analogy
to the right of publicity." The court also reasoned that a descendi-
ble right of publicity was not necessary to motivate persons to seek
excellence in their chosen fields. At the same time, the court ex-
pressed concern that such a right would encourage monopolistic
practices and reduce economic opportunity for others. Consequently,
it reversed the trial court and held that the Foundation was free to
market its Presley statuettes.
154. 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980).
155. Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors, Etc., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1323 (W.D. Tenn. 1977).
156. Id. at 1330-31.
157. 616 F.2d at 958.
158. Id. at 959.
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Use of analogies to the law of privacy, property or defamation,
however, may lead courts to overlook the policy issues that are in-
volved in the descendibility question. Accordingly, the answer to the
descendibility problem lies, not in reliance on analogies, but rather
on a consideration of the social policies which either support or mili-
tate against survival of publicity rights after death.159
B. Policy Considerations
As mentioned earlier, inter vivos recognition of publicity rights
rests on two bases-the need to allow the celebrity to profit from his
achievements so that he will be induced to continue his creative en-
deavors and the need to prevent unfair competition which occurs
when one reaps the benefits of another's labor. As the Memphis De-
velopment court pointed out, however, allowing the celebrity unlim-
ited control over the commercial use of his persona is monopolis-
tic.160 In the Factors' case, for example, Boxcar granted exclusive
licenses to other companies to produce and sell Elvis Presley
memorabilia. The royalty rate paid to Boxcar by Factors and others
no doubt reflected the fact that Boxcar would not license any poten-
tial competitors. This lack of competition would presumably allow
Boxcar's licensees to charge higher prices for their products than
would be possible in a competitive market. Thus, the profits of Box-
car and its licensees would be maximized at the expense of
consumers.
Striking a balance in favor of the celebrity may be appropriate
during the celebrity's lifetime, but once the celebrity has died, the
case for allowing his heirs to maximize their profits is less compel-
ling. Insofar as the inducement rationale is concerned, the case for
post mortem protection of publicity values is obviously weaker than
the case for recognition of such values during the celebrity's lifetime.
As the court in Memphis Development pointed out, noneconomic
factors often play a major part in motivating persons to seek excel-
159. See Felcher & Rubin, note 10 supra, where the authors state:
[A] major difficulty with analogies . . . is that they tend to impose a mature
elaborated system on what may be an unformulated situation. The choice of anal-
ogy may not be fully justifiable, and the analogy's application to the situation may
carry with it a misleading certainty. In the present case, none of the analogies of
privacy, defamation, or property law seems correct to apply to the publicity issue;
once one is chosen, however, it resolves the descendibility issue with a force much
too decisive for the complex and subtle nature of the problem.
Id. at 1127-28.
160. Memphis D.v. Found., 616 F.2d at 959.
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lence in a chosen field: "[S]uch needs come from the deep psycho-
logical fact that individuals want the respect and good will of other
persons and 'enjoy the exercise of their realized capacities . . . and
this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized, or the
greater its complexity.' "161 Compared with these psychological fac-
tors, the desire to exploit fame for the commercial advantage of
one's heirs is generally a weak principle of motivation. Therefore,
according to the Memphis Development court, a descendible right of
publicity would not significantly inspire creative efforts.
It appears, however, that the Memphis Development court un-
derestimated the motivational force of the desire to provide financial
security for family members and other dependents."6 ' More impor-
tantly, the court overlooked the impact of a nondescendibility rule on
the value of publicity rights during the celebrity's lifetime. If the
rights become worthless after the celebrity's death, the price paid to
the celebrity for such rights will be less.' 6 s To this extent, the celeb-
rity is partially deprived of the fruits of his labor and the incentive
to produce things of value for society may be correspondingly
diminished.
The second basis for recognition of publicity rights is the pre-
vention of unfair competition and unjust enrichment. Although
traditional unfair competition, in the sense of passing off, is less
likely in the case of a deceased celebrity, unfair competition might
result with respect to an assignee who has purchased a celebrity's
publicity rights if a competitor is able to exploit these same values at
no cost.'" As the Factors I court declared:
To hold that the right did not survive Presley's death would be to
grant competitors of Factors, such as Pro Arts, a windfall in the
form of profits from the use of Presley's name and likeness. At
the same time, the exclusive right purchased by Factors and the
financial benefits accruing to the celebrity's heirs would be ren-
dered virtually worthless.' 15
Thus, it appears the considerations that support inter vivos pro-
tection of publicity rights still apply, though with less force, after
161. Id. at 958-59 (quoting J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 426-27 (1971)).
162. Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright. 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 508 (1945).
Chafee relates how Erskine, after his maiden argument at the bar, when asked how he had the
courage to stand up so boldly before the formidable Lord Mansfield, replied, "I could feel my
little children tugging at my gown."
163. Comment, note 82 supra, at 1127.
164. Note, note 132 supra, at 547; Note, Inheritability of the Right of Publicity Upon
the Death of the Famous. 33 VAND. L. REV. 1251, 1261 (1980).
165. 579 F.2d at 221.
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death. However, the countervailing public interests in providing for
free competition in the marketplace must also be taken into consid-
eration. This burden is arguably outweighed during the celebrity's
lifetime by the interest in controlling his career. After death, how-
ever, the interests of the celebrity are less significant, while the pub-
lic's interest in free competition remains undiminished. Under these
circumstances, some courts would strike the balance in favor of free
competition.
1 66
Nevertheless, while acknowledging the merit of the Memphis
Development court's argument, it is difficult to reconcile its decision
with the post mortem recognition given to performance rights under
federal copyright law. 167 Under the statute, the balance is struck in
favor of the performer and his monopoly, at least for a time, is al-
lowed to continue after death. Consequently, it can be argued that
publicity rights should be allowed to survive the celebrity's death in
some circumstances, but durational or other restrictions should be
imposed on the exercise of such rights in order to lessen the anti-
competitive effects of post mortem recognition.
C. Limitations on Survivability
Perhaps in recognition of the divergent interests of the celebrity
(and his heirs or assignees) and the public, some courts have limited
post mortem exercise of publicity rights. The prevailing approach is
to allow publicity rights to survive only when the celebrity took steps
to exploit them while alive. Their objective is to protect the legiti-
mate expectations of close relatives of the decedent, as well as his
assignees, while preventing remote heirs from interfering with the
free flow of goods to the public.
The Lugosi court expressed the fear that remote heirs would
166. See, e.g., Memphis Dev. Found., 616 F.2d at 960, where the court stated:
It seems fairer and more efficient for the commercial, aesthetic, and political use
of the name, memory and image of the famous to be open to all rather than to be
monopolzied by a few. An equal distribution of the opportunity to use the name of
the dead seems preferable. The memory, name and pictures of famous individuals
should be regarded as a common asset to be shared, an economic opportunity
available in the free market system.
Id.
167. Under the 1909 Copyright Act, the copyright term began at the time of publication
and lasted 28 years. The author of his heirs or assigns, however, could renew the copyright for
another 28 years, making a total potential term of 56 years in all cases. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1976)
(repealed 1976). Thus, the copyright term bore no relation to the life of the author. Under the
1976 Copyright Act, the usual copyright term for works created after 1978, consists of the life
of the author plus an additional 50 years. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (Supp. V 1981).
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attempt to exploit the publicity rights of long-dead celebrities. For
example, the court queried, could the descendants of George Wash-
ington sue the Secretary of the Treasury for placing his likeness on
the dollar bill? Could the descendants of Abraham Lincoln recover
damages against the Lincoln National Life Insurance Company for
their commercial exploitation of his name and likeness?168 As a
practical matter, however, such lawsuits would seldom succeed be-
cause the plaintiff would have to prove that he is the heir of the
decedent and not merely a descendant. As Schumann v. Loew's
Inc.16 illustrates, the more remote the relationship, the more difficult
the plaintiff's proof problems will be.170 In the Schumann case, some
of the great-grandchildren of Robert Schumann brought suit against
the producers of Song of Love, a movie based on the composer's life.
The plaintiffs objected to the film's portrayal of Schumann's mental
illness and its suggestion that his insanity was hereditary. The plain-
tiff's alleged libel, invasion of privacy and misappropriation. The
court rejected the privacy and defamation theories because these ac-
tions could not be brought on behalf of a dead person. In dis-
missing the misappropriation action, the court declared that even if
the defendant had misappropriated a property right of Robert Schu-
mann's, the plaintiffs had failed to establish that they were the ap-
propriate parties to assert this right. The court noted that Schumann
had died in Germany in 1856 and the plaintiffs had not produced
evidence of whether Schumann had left a will or, if he had died
intestate, that the plaintiffs represented all of his descendants who
would have been able to claim as his heirs under the German intes-
tacy laws of that time.171
1. Inter Vivos Exploitation
One of the most effective ways to prevent heirs of deceased ce-
lebrities from playing "dog in the manger" is to allow the right of
publicity to survive only if it was exercised during the celebrity's life-
time.1 7 8 A federal court adopted this view in Hicks v. Casablanca
168. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 827, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 331, 603 P.2d
425, 433 (1979) (Mosk, J., concurring).
169. 135 N.Y.S.2d 361 (Sup. Ct., New York County 1954), final amended complaint
dismissed, 144 N.Y.S.2d 27 (Sup. Ct., New York County 1955).
170. Sobel, Count Dracula and the Right of Publicity, 47 L.A.B. BULL. 373, 403-04
(1972); Note, note 132 supra, at 547-48.
171. 135 N.Y.S.2d at 365, 368.
172. Id. at 369.
173. See generally Felcher & Rubin, note 10 supra.
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Records,7 "4 a case where the heirs of Agatha Christie tried to enjoin
distribution of a book and movie based on a celebrated incident in
the mystery writer's life. The court declared that the plaintiff must
show that "the decedent acted in such a way as to evidence his or
her own recognition of the extrinsic commercial value of his or her
name or likeness, and manifested that recognition in some overt
manner .. ."17 The court then concluded that the decedent had
exploited her publicity rights while alive by using the name "Agatha
Christie" in connection with the sale of books, plays and movie
rights. 176 This approach has been endorsed by other courts as well.'
77
For example, in Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions,1 78 the
court denied recovery in a suit brought by the nephew of Rudolf
Valentino against the producers of a motion picture about Valen-
tino's life. In the court's opinion, Valentino had not exploited the
publicity values associated with his persona so as to create property
of a recognized and inheritable character.
7 9
One can justify this inter vivos exploitation requirement on the
basis that it ensures that the decedent's intent will be carried out. 80
174. 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
175. Id. at 429.
176. Id. at 429-30. The court, however, denied relief on the basis that a fictionalized
biography that was not misleading was protected speech under the first amendment. Id. at
433.
177. See Factors 1, 652 F.2d 278, 287 n.4 (2d Cir. 1981) (Mansfield, J., dissenting); 579
F.2d 215, 221 (2d Cir. 1978); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279, 284
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
178. 73 Cal. App. 3d 436 (opinion omitted), 140 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1977), affd, 25 Cal. 3d
860, 603 P.2d 454, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979).
179. 140 Cal. Rptr. at 779. See also James v. Screen Gems, Inc., 174 Cal. App. 2d 650,
344 P.2d 799 (1959), and Maritote v. Desilu Prod's, Inc., 345 F.2d 418 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 382 U.S. 883 (1965), which, although decided under the right of privacy theory, are
consistent with this principle. In James, the widow of Jesse James, Jr., son of the famous
outlaw, sued the producers of the television play Bitter Heritage, which portrayed her husband
as an outcast in the community and one who had been implicated in a bank robbery. The court
treated the plaintiff's claim as false light privacy rather than interference with the right of
publicity and denied recovery. 174 Cal. App. 2d at 653-54, 344 P.2d at 801.
In Maritote, where a suit was brought by the wife and son of Al Capone against the
producers of The Untouchables, the court again applied the law of privacy and refused to
allow recovery. In this case, however, the plaintiffs were joined by the administratix of
Capone's estate, who asserted a right to recover for unjust enrichment due to defendant's ap-
propriation of Capone's name, likeness, and personality. The trial court denied recovery and
this judgment was affirmed on appeal. 345 F.2d at 420.
180. Cf. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 603 P.2d 425
(1979), where the court declared:
The very decision to exploit name and likeness is a personal one. It is not at all
unlikely that Lugosi and others in his position did not during their respective life-
times exercise their undoubted right to capitalize upon their personalities, and
transfer the value thereof into some commercial venture, for reasons of taste or
judgment or because the enterprise to be organized might be too demanding or
simply because -hey did not want to be bothered.
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When a celebrity enters into licensing agreements or similar ar-
rangements, it indicates that he intends to capitalize upon the recog-
nition values with which his identity is imbued. These actions also
suggest that the exploitation of publicity values is a motivating fac-
tor in leading the celebrity to achieve excellence in his chosen field of
endeavor. Moreover, once the celebrity manifests an intent to exploit
his publicity rights for his own benefit, it is reasonable to assume
that he desires to benefit his heirs or legatees as well.181 On the other
hand, two courts appear to have recognized a descendible right of
publicity regardless of whether the celebrity exploited his recognition
values during his lifetime. Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc.,' z in-
volved the publicity rights of comedians Stan Laurel and Oliver
Hardy. The defendant argued that Laurel and Hardy's failure to use
their caricatures and imitations during their lifetime constituted an
abandonment of their right of publicity. The court rejected this con-
tention, declaring that "[T]here cannot, therefore, be any necessity
to exercise the right of publicity during one's life in order to protect
it from use by others or to preserve any potential right of one's
heirs." 183 In Martin Luther King Jr. Center for Social Change, Inc.
v. American Heritage Products,184 the Georgia Supreme Court also
rejected the inter vivos exploitation requirement. The defendant in
that case was engaged in selling plastic busts of the late Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr. Its advertisements contained photographs of Dr.
King and excerpts from his copyrighted speeches. In addition, the
defendant's promotional material also stated that a portion of the
purchase price would be donated to the Martin Luther King, Jr.
Center for Social Change, a nonprofit corporation established to pro-
mote the ideals of Dr. King. Suit was brought in federal court to
enjoin promotion and sale of the busts.185 The district court refused
to enjoin sale of the busts, 8 " concluding that it would not be neces-
Id. at 822, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 328, 603 P.2d at 430.
181. None of the reported cases to date have involved a specific testamentary bequest of
publicity rights. For example, in Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), and Groucho Marx Prod's, Inc., v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), claims were brought by sole beneficiaries or residuary beneficiaries under a will.
182. 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
183. Id. at 846 (footnote omitted).
184. 250 Ga. 135, 296 S.E.2d 697 (1982).
185. The plaintiffs included the Center, Coretta Scott King, as administratrix of Dr.
King's estate, and Motown Record Corporation, the assignee of the rights of several of Dr.
King's copyrighted speeches.
186. Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage
Prod's, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ga. 1981). The court, however, did enjoin the defendant
from using the Center's name in its advertising. The court found that the defendant had in-
fringed upon the King copyrights and enjoined all further use of copyrighted material. Id. at
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sary to determine whether the right of publicity was devisable in
Georgia because Dr. King did not commercially exploit this right
during his lifetime.187 When the plaintiffs appealed, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit certified the question to the Georgia
Supreme Court. The Georgia Supreme Court held that the right of
publicity was recognized in Georgia and that it was inheritable and
devisable." In addition, the court concluded that commercial ex-
ploitation " 9 during the celebrity's life was not necessary for the right
of publicity to survive. The court observed that inter vivos exploita-
tion requirement, which originated in the Hicks decision, was no
more than dictum since the case was ultimately decided on other
grounds.1 90 The court concluded that it was unfair to protect those
entertainers and athletes who exploited their personae during life
while denying similar protection to those who achieved fame but did
not exploit themselves during life.191
In reaching this conclusion, however, the Georgia court seems to
have confused the right of publicity with the right of privacy. It
noted that Dr. King had refused to exploit his image commercially
because it would have impaired his influence in the civil rights move-
ment. According to the court, Dr. King's failure to exercise his pub-
licity rights should not "strip his family and estate of the right to
control, preserve and extend his status and memory and to prevent
unauthorized exploitation thereof by others. Here, they seek to pre-
vent the exploitation of his likeness in a manner they consider unflat-
tering and unfitting."1 3 It is submitted that the right of publicity is
intended to protect economic, not dignitary interests. Therefore, the
preservation of a public figure's "memory" should not be used as a
basis for allowing publicity rights to survive death. " Nevertheless,
861, 866.
187. Id. at 864.
188. 296 S.E.2d at 705. The court stated that "[rjecognition of the right of publicity
rewards and thereby encourages effort and creativity." Id. According to the court, if the right
of publicity did not survive death, the economic value of this right during life would be dimin-
ished because the celebrity's untimely death would seriously impair, if not destroy, the value of
the right of continued commercial use. Conversely, those who would profit from the fame of a
celebrity after his or her death for their own benefit and without authorization have failed to
establish their claim that they should be the beneficiaries of the celebrity's death. Id.
189. The court defined "exploitation" as commercial use by the celebrity other than the
activity which made him or her famous. Id.
190. Id. at 705-06.
191. Id. at 706. As a result of the Georgia court's ruling, the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court. 25 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPY-
RIGHT J. (BNA) 215 (Jan. 13, 1983).
192. 296 S.E.2d at 706.
193. This is not to suggest that in certain situations noneconomic motives might not influ-
19821
TEMPLE LAW QUARTERLY
there are problems with the inter vivos exploitation requirement. In
the first place the rule may be unfair to those who were unable to
exploit their personae while they were alive. While it can be argued
that inter vivos exercise of publicity rights evidences an awareness of
their value by the celebrity, failure to exploit them does not necessa-
rily imply the contrary. A celebrity may in fact desire to capitalize
upon his publicity values, on his own behalf or for the benefit of his
heirs, and yet be forced to wait until he achieves sufficient public
recognition to make his identity marketable. This point may not be
reached during his lifetime, but rather may be brought about by
death.194 In this situation the inter vivos exploitation requirement is
unfair. In addition, it seems anomalous to deny that exploitation is
necessary when a living celebrity seeks to vindicate his right of pub-
licity, 95 and yet require it as a condition precedent to survival when
a celebrity's heirs are asserting a right of publicity.
Finally, it is difficult to see how inter vivos exploitation can be
shown in the absence of a formal assignment or licensing scheme.
The issue arose in Groucho Marx Productions v. Day and Night
Company, Inc.'" The defendants, who produced a broadway play
which featured actors impersonating the Marx Brothers, contended
that exploitation required commercial use which was distinct from
the celebrity's main commercial activity. In other words, according
to defendants, exploitation of the right of publicity required commer-
cial "tie-up" activities.197 The court, however, rejected this argu-
ment, declaring instead that the celebrity need only act in some way
that demonstrated an intent to capitalize on the commercial value of
his name and likeness. 198 As the court declared:
ence how publicity rights are exercised, or whether they are exercised at all. Rather, it is
submitted that a decision to extend the scope of the right of publicity should not use the
protection of a dignitary interest as its rationale.
194. See Note, Lugosi v. Universal Pictures: Descent of the Right of Publicity, 29 HAS-
TINGs L.J. 751, 765 (1978).
195. See Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Esquire was found
liable for publishing an article on clothing styles in which Cary Grant's head was superim-
posed upon the torso of the model who had originally posed for the Esquire pictures. The court
found that Grant's right of publicity had been infringed upon even though he had disclaimed
any desire to exploit it himself. As the court observed: "If the owner of Blackacre decides for
reasons of his own not to use his land but to keep it in reserve he is not precluded from
prosecuting trespassers." Id. at 880.
196. 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
197. A commercial tie-up means an association of the celebrity's name or likeness with a
collateral product. See Nimmer, note 13 supra, at 212. Examples of commercial tie-ups would
include endorsements of products and authorizing the sale of memorabilia embodying the li-
censor's name or likeness.
198. See also Martin Luther King Jr. Center, 508 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ga. 1981). In a
suit against a defendant who sold plastic busts of Dr. Martin Luther King, the court held that
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Every appearance, contract and advertisement involving the Marx
Brothers signified recognition by the performers of the commer-
cial value of unique characters they portrayed. To suggests, as
defendants do, that the right of publicity was not exploited be-
cause the Marx Brothers did not endorse dance studios, candy
bars or tee shirts is wholly illogical. '
Not only does this language indicate that the inter vivos exploitation
requirement can be satisfied by something less than a formal assign-
ment of publicity rights, it implies that entertainers will be deemed
to have exploited their publicity values simply by pursuing their per-
forming careers. This interpretation would, however, eviscerate the
inter vivos exploitation requirement as a meaningful test for sur-
vivability, at least where entertainers are concerned.
It may be possible to interpret the Groucho Marx holding some-
what more narrowly. The offending conduct in that case involved an
impersonation of the Marx Brothers' characters and performing
style. One can argue that this type of publicity interest is not nor-
mally assigned, and therefore, the court was correct in concluding
that the Marx Brothers had exploited this aspect of their publicity
rights sufficiently to ensure its survival after death. The court, how-
ever, did not suggest that the Marx Brothers' activities were suffi-
cient to enable their heirs or assignees, for example, to prevent a
third party from marketing Marx Brothers posters. Therefore, one
might argue that inter vivos activities by'the celebrity should be suf-
ficient to secure post mortem survival of those same types of public-
ity rights, but that rights associated with commercial "tie-up" activi-
ties should survive death only if the celebrity demonstrated an intent
to exercise those rights by entering into contracts to exploit his rec-
ognition values in an appropriate manner. o0
Perhaps a better approach, however, would be to allow only as-
signees who purchased publicity rights from a celebrity during his
lifetime to maintain a cause of action after the celebrity's death.
This approach, of course, completely avoids the possibility of remote
right of publicity did not descend to Dr. King's estate because the civil rights leader had not
exploited the right during his lifetime. Id. at 864.
199. 523 F. Supp. at 491-92.
200. In California, the right of publicity, if it descends at all, would probably be so lim-
ited. The court in Lugosi acknowledged that the decedent had assigned limited publicity rights
to Universal Pictures in connection with the promotion of his movie, Dracula. This, appar-
ently, was not enough to create a descendible right of publicity that would include use of his
likeness on such articles as greeting cards, T-shirts, Halloween costumes and masks, wax
figurines, mechanical walking toys, picture puzzles, and the like.
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heirs asserting a long dormant publicity interest. 01 More impor-
tantly, it protects the value of the assignment contract, thereby pro-
tecting the assignee's investment and ensuring that the celebrity will
receive full value for his publicity rights during his lifetime. Addi-
tionally, this approach relieves the parties and the court of the diffi-
cult task of determining the extent to which the celebrity may have
exploited his publicity rights in the past. The assignment contract
itself will specify the nature of the rights conveyed. The publicity
right will be limited to the length of the contract, which will typi-
cally be for a relatively short term. 0 Moreover, the court can inter-
pret the contract terms narrowly and may invalidate perpetual or
unreasonably long contracts on grounds of public policy.
The greatest weakness with this approach is that, although it
gives the assignee full protection, the heirs are protected only to the
extent that the assignment contract provides for the payment of roy-
alties. The astute celebrity, of course, would seldom make a com-
plete assignment of his publicity rights to another, but will insist on
a licensing or royalty arrangement so that he can retain some control
over the exploitation of his persona and maximize his profits there-
from. 8 On the other hand, entertainers and athletes at the begin-
ning of their careers might assign their entire publicity interest with-
out intending to do so when such assignments are included as
boilerplate provisions in performance contracts. If this sort of con-
tract would be treated as unconscionable when enforced against the
celebrity during his lifetime, it would be equally inappropriate to
recognize its validity after death.
2. Durational Limits on the Right of Publicity
Quite apart from its inherent weaknesses, it can be argued that
the inter vivos exploitation rule does not alone provide a rational ba-
sis for balancing the rights of the celebrity and those of the public.
The rule simply operates to cut off some rights entirely while appar-
201. Cf Schumann v. Loew's Inc., 135 N.Y.2d 361 (Sup. Ct., New York County 1954),
final amended complaint dismissed, 144 N.Y.S.2d 27 (Sup. Ct., New York County 1955)
(great-grandchildren of composer Robert Schumann).
202. For example, in the Factors 11 litigation, the Boxcar-Factors contract granted an
exclusive license to Factors for 18 months, renewable at the licensee's option for up to four
years, to use Presley's name and likeness in connection with the manufacture and sale of any
kind of merchandise. Factors agreed to pay a royalty of five percent of sales, subject to a
minimum royalty for the first 18 months of $150,000. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652
F.2d at 279.
203. Comment, note 82 supra, at 1120.
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ently allowing others to run indefinitely. Of course, limiting survival
of publicity rights to assignees, as suggested earlier, may resolve this
problem, but a better approach would be to deal with the balancing
issue in another way. The law of copyright provides a useful model.
Like the right of publicity, copyright gives the creator of intel-
lectual property exclusive control over its distribution." The social
policy that justifies this sort of monopoly is the same inducement
rationale that partially underlies the right of publicity. 05 In the case
of copyright law, the balance between public and private interests is
struck by allowing monopoly, but limiting its duration.2 6 Similarly if
a post mortem right of publicity is recognized, a durational limit
could be placed on its exercise by heirs or assignees of the decedent.
Having reached this point, however, one must contend with the prob-
lem that concerned the court in Memphis Development-deciding
what durational limit to apply.0 One solution would allow the
courts to set durational limits on publicity rights on an ad hoc ba-
sis.2 08 Another alternative would be to permit the exercise of public-
ity rights for the life of the surviving spouse or the surviving spouse
and children of the celebrity.
Adopting an express durational limit, however, provides a better
means of ensuring that the legitimate expectations of the celebrity,
his heirs and those with whom he has contracted are safeguarded,
while the public's interest in free competition is also given appropri-
ate weight. The similarity between publicity rights and the interest
protected by a copyright have led some commentators to suggest
that the copyright period of life plus fifty years be applied to the
right of publicity.' 9 Keeping in mind that society does not directly
benefit from the protection of publicity values as it does from the
204. The Copyright Act of 1976 gives the copyright holder the exclusive right to
reproduce, distribute, perform, or display the copyrighted work or prepare derivative works
based on it. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. V 1981). This right, which may be assigned, now lasts for
the life of the author plus an additional 50 years. Id. § 302.
205. Zaccini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977); Shipley,
note I I supra, at 682-83. See also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
206. In the words of Lord Mansfield:
[W]e must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the one
that men of ability, who have employed their time for the service of the commu-
nity, may not be deprived of their just merits, and the reward of their ingenuity
and labour; the other, that the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor
the progress of the arts be retarded.
Sayre v. Moore, I East 361, 362, 102 Eng. Rep. 139, 140 (K.B. 1785).
207. Memphis Dev. Found., 616 F.2d at 959.
208. Comment, note 4 supra, at 1007.
209. Comment, note 82 supra. at 1126-28.
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creative activity protected by copyright, 210 a shorter limitation period
such as twenty years seems more reasonable.21 This reflects the fact
that recognition values have less social utility than the creative val-
ues protected by copyright law, while the opposing public interest in
free competition remains the same in each case. Even if a descendi-
ble right of publicity motivates creative activity, the reduced incen-
tive to the celebrity is more than offset by the public gain."'
Since courts are usually reluctant to adopt fixed periods with
respect to the duration of property rights, a legislative response may
be necessary. If this is done at the state level, however, the dura-
tional period specified will vary from state to state. The resulting
confusion and uncertainty may effectively destroy the efficacy of post
mortem publicity rights. Consequently, federal legislation would
probably be necessary to carry out any workable scheme of fixed-
period publicity rights.""
III. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF PUBLICITY RIGHTS
The preemption doctrine, derived from the Constitution's
supremacy clause,' 14 nullifies a state statute or common-law doctrine
that interferes with the attainment of federal legislative objectives.21 5
Recently, the growing recognition of publicity rights has given rise to
speculation about the preemptive effect of federal copyright legisla-
tion on this aspect of state common law. Some commentators have
maintained that some publicity rights are inconsistent with federal
copyright policies. 16 While others have contended that publicity
rights do not conflict with federal law and, therefore, should not be
210. Hoffman, note 81 supra, at 118.
211. Where a "joint" right of publicity is involved, as in the case of Laurel and Hardy,
Abbott and Costello, the Marx Brothers, or the Three Stooges, the post mortem limitation
should not begin to run until the death of the last surviving member of the group. This is the
approach taken with jointly-held copyrights. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(b) (Supp. V 1981).
212. As Lord Macaulay once said, a monopoly of 60 years produces three times as much
evil as a monopoly of 20 years, but it by no means gives an author three times as much
pleasure or three times as much motivation to create. 8 THE WORKS OF LORD MACAULAY
199-200 (1866).
213. Federal legislation of this nature is proposed in the text following note 284 infra.
214. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.
215. See, e.g.. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978) (federal regulation of
oil tankers preempts state law); City of Burbank v Lockheed Air Terminal Inc., 411 U.S. 624
(1973) (city ordinance restricting use of airport preempted by Federal Aeronautics Act);
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (state alien registration law preempted by federal
statute governing registration of aliens); McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913) (state
labelling law in conflict with federal labeling regulations preempted). For a discussion of fed-
eral preemption, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 6-23-27 (1978).
216. Shipley, note 11 supra.
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preempted. In fact, this dispute reflects a broader controversy over
whether any form of state protection of intellectual property is com-
patible with federal patent and copyright legislation.
A. An Overview of the Preemption Controversy
Over the years two opposing views have emerged. Proponents of
the broad view of federal preemption argue that federal patent and
copyright legislation has occupied the field and left no room for pro-
tection of equivalent interests under state law.a18 According to this
position, that which is not protected by federal law is placed in the
public domain.219 Under the narrower view of federal preemption,
however, the states remain free to protect intellectual property which
is not covered by federal law as long as state rights do not conflict
with the federal statutory scheme.
2 20
The broad theory of federal preemption was reflected in Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.22 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc. 2 2 In the Sears-Compco cases, the defendants copied
unpatentable industrial designs and were held liable under state un-
fair competition doctrines .2 2  The United States Supreme Court,
however, reversed these decisions, holding that such liability con-
flicted with the federal policy of allowing free access to copy
whatever the federal patent and copyright laws left in the public do-
main.2 2 4 The Sears-Compco decisions apparently led the First Cir-
217. i M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHTS § 1.01[B] at 1-13-14 n.49.
218. Cases in other areas where federal occupation of the field has been held to preempt
state regulation include: Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees
of Am. v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 296 (1971); Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 301
(1961); Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 348 U.S. 61 (1954); Erie R.R. v. New York, 233
U.S. 671 (1914).
219. See Capitol Records, Inc., v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 664 (2d Cir.
1955) (Hand, J., dissenting); Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280-81 (2d Cir.
1929). Judge Learned Hand's preemption theory is discussed in Goldstein, Federal System
Ordering of the Copyright Interest, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 49, 51-62 (1969); Note, The Copying-
Misappropriation Distinction: A False Step in the Sears-Compco Preemption Doctrine, 71
COLUM. L. REV. 1444, 1447-50 (1971).
220. Cases in other areas which have upheld state regulations that were not inconsistent
with federal regulatory provisions include: Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continen-
tal Air Lines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714, 722-24 (1963) (state statute barring discrimination in hiring
upheld); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 730 (1949) (upholding state prohibition of trans-
portation not licensed by ICC); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (state marketing
scheme for raisin crop upheld).
221. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
222. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
223. Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115, 118 (7th Cir. 1963); Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corp., 311 F.2d 26, 30 (7th Cir. 1962).
224. Sears, 376 U.S. at 231-32; Compco, 376 U.S. at 237.
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cuit in Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. DeCosta225 to hold
that any creation, whether or not protected under federal law, must
comply with requirements of the Copyright Act to avoid falling into
the public domain." 6
In DeCosta, the plaintiff claimed that CBS had appropriated his
"Paladin" character in its television series Have Gun Will Travel.
DeCosta appeared in parades, rodeos, auctions and horse shows at-
tired in black shirt, pants and hat. The plaintiff also affixed a St.
Mary's medal to his hat and carried an antique derringer strapped to
his arm. He adopted the name Paladin and passed out cards which
featured the symbol of a chess knight and the words "Have Gun,
Will Travel, Wire Paladin, N. Court St., Cranston, R.I." DeCosta
brought suit against CBS alleging misappropriation, trademark in-
fringement and unfair competition under the passing off theory. The
trial court held in DeCosta's favor on the misappropriation count.
On appeal, however, this judgment was reversed. The appellate court
asserted that the federal policy favoring free dissemination of intel-
lectual creations prohibited the state from extending protection
against copying a character that was "so slight a thing as not to
warrant protection by any law. '2 7 The court declared that the Pala-
din character was "ineffable," and therefore neither eligible for cop-
yright protection nor for protection under other state or federal
law.2
28
A similarly broad reading of the Sears-Compco cases led an-
other federal court to deny recovery for misappropriation of the
plaintiff's singing style in Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber
Co.22" In the Sinatra case, Goodyear produced a television commer-
cial which featured a female vocalist who sang "These Boots Are
Made for Walkin'." Although Goodyear had obtained permission
from the copyright holder to use the song in its commercial, the song
225. 377 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1007 (1968).
226. Id. at 321.
227. Id. at 320.
228. Id. In De Costa v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 520 F.2d 499 (lst Cir. 1975), the
court considered the two remaining counts in De Costa's original complaint: common-law
trademark infringement and unfair competition. The court acknowledged that Goldstein man-
dated a retreat from its earlier expansive reading of Sears and Compco, but, again, held in
favor of the defendant, CBS, declaring that the public would not have confused his Paladin
character with that of CBS. Id. at 514. For a discussion of the Paladin cases, see Laff &
Saret, Further Unraveling of Sears-Compco: Of Patches, Paladin and Laurel & Hardy, 7
Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 33, 45 (1976).
229. 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971). See also Booth v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343, 346-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (recovery denied against
defendant who imitated plaintiff's voice in television commercial).
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was widely associated in the public's mind with singer Nancy Sina-
tra and the vocalist in the commercial imitated Sinatra's singing
style. Sinatra admitted that her singing style did not qualify for fed-
eral copyright protection, but argued that Goodyear's commercial
amounted to unfair competition under state law. The trial court held
in favor of the plaintiff. On appeal, however, the Ninth Circuit re-
versed, holding that the use of the doctrine of unfair competition in
this manner was contrary to an overriding federal policy favoring
free competition in ideas which do not merit patent or copyright pro-
tection. 30 Put another way, that which was excluded from the fed-
eral copyright laws remains in the public domain. In addition, ac-
cording to the court, recognizing Sinatra's interest in her singing
style would undermine the market for the copyrighted song, thereby
impairing the value of the copyright holder's interest. The court con-
cluded that this result would also be contrary to the policy of federal
copyright legislation. 3 1
The Sears-Compco holdings, however, were qualified by the Su-
preme Court in Goldstein v. California232 and Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp.2 33 In Goldstein the Court upheld California's record
piracy law, holding that the 1909 Copyright Act did not foreclose
state regulation of a category of writings unregulated by Congress,
so long as that regulation did not interfere with federal copyright
policy.234 In Kewanee Oil, the Court, applying the Goldstein ration-
ale, held that federal patent law did not preempt a cause of action
under state law for disclosure of trade secrets.235 These cases signal a
retreat from the broad preemption theory of the Sears-Compco deci-
sions and suggest that federal controls do not necessarily replace all
state recognition of intellectual property which is potentially eligible
for federal patent or copyright protection. Instead, according to
Goldstein and Kewanee Oil, state doctrines are preempted only when
they conflict with the objectives of federal law. It is against this
background, therefore, that the scope of federal preemption, particu-
larly under the new Copyright Act, on state-created rights of public-
230. 435 F.2d at 717.
231. Id. at 718.
232. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
233. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
234. 412 U.S. at 560. For a further discussion of the Goldstein case, see Brown, Publica-
tion and Preemption in Copyright Law: Elegiac Reflections on Goldstein v. Californid, 22
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1022 (1975); Note, Goldstein v. California: Breaking Up Federal Copyright
Preemption, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 960 (1974); Note, Goldstein v. California:, Validity of State
Copyright under the Copyright and Supremacy Clauses. 25 HASTrNos L.J. 1196 (1974).
235. 416 U.S. at 474.
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ity must be examined.
B. Preemption Under the Copyright Act of 1976
In 1976, the 1909 Copyright Act was replaced by a new stat-
ute, 3 6 which creates a system of federal protection for all "original
works of authorship," published or unpublished, from the moment
they are fixed in a tangible medium of expression. 3 This legislation
virtually abolishes the concept of common law copyright.2" More-
236. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Supp. V 1981)).
237. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp. V 1981). The new act extends copyright protection to a
number of mediums of expression, such as phonograph recordings and radio or television
broadcasts, which were not included under the original 1909 Copyright Act.
238. See Goldstein, Preempted State Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers and Compulsory
Licenses: Testing the Limits of Copyright, 24 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1107, 1110-11 (1977). Com-
mon law copyright protected authors and composers of unpublished material who had not
obtained a statutory copyright or those whose intellectual or creative products were not enti-
tled to protection under federal copyright law. Thus, state courts enjoined unauthorized dupli-
cation or retransmission of uncopyrightable radio and television broadcasts under the theory
that the defendant had infringed upon the common law copyright interest of the broadcaster.
See generally Warner, Protection of the Content of Radio and Television Programs by Com-
mon-Law Copyright, 3 VAND. L. REv. 209 (1950).
The performer's rights in a live performance also were protected against unauthorized
duplication, but the scope of common law copyright in recorded performances was less clear.
Phonograph records could not be copyrighted under the 1909 Copyright Act, although the
author or composer could obtain statutory protection for the underlying composition by secur-
ing a copyright on the script or musical score. See Kaplan, Publication in Copyright Law: The
Question of Phonograph Records, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 469, 482-86 (1955). However, the only
copyright protection available to the entertainer to protect his performance arose under state
law. Frequently, recovery hinged on whether the court regarded the sale of phonograph records
as a general publication of the performance. A general publication was an act of the owner
whereby the subject matter was made available to the general public under circumstances
permitting copies to be made or which indicated an intention of rendering the work common
property or implied an abandonment and dedication of the work to the general public. Warner,
3 VAND. L. REv. at 225-26. A limited or qualified publication is one which communicates a
knowledge of a work's contents without dedicating it to the public. Nimmer, Copyright Publi-
cation, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 185, 200-01 (1956). Mere performance of a play or musical com-
position was treated as a limited publication, and was, therefore, insufficient to divest the au-
thor or composer of his rights under common law copyright. See Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S.
424, 435 (1912). By analogy, it was argued that sale of phonograph records of uncopyrighted
material did not constitute a general publication insofar as the author or composer was con-
cerned. Comment, note 1 supra, at 823-24.
With regard to the right of performance, the leading case is Waring v. WDAS Broadcast-
ing Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631 (1937). Fred Waring and his Pennsylvanians had
recorded a number of records for RCA. Pursuant to the licensing agreement between Waring
and RCA, the records bore the legend "Not licensed for radio broadcast." When the defen-
dant, WDAS, broadcast these records over the air, Waring sought injunctive relief. The court
agreed with Waring that he had a common law copyright interest in his performance and that
the sale of phonograph records of his performance did not divest him of that interest. Id. at
442, 194 A. at 635. Other courts, however, have reached the opposite conclusion, holding that
the sale of phonograph records constituted general publication and destroyed the performer's
rights to his performance. See RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 88-89 (2d Cir.
1940). However, the new Copyright Act extends protection to phonograph recordings and ra-
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over, section 301(a) of the new act provides that any state law,
whether based on common law or statute, is preempted if it creates
"legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive
rights within the federal scope of copyright as specified by section
106 11 and if these rights under state law may be claimed in "works
of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and
come within the subject matter of copyright. 24 0 In addition, section
301(b) expressly preserves causes of action under state law with re-
spect to "subject matter that does not come within the subject mat-
ter of copyright . . . including works of authorship not fixed in any
tangible medium of expression." 2" Furthermore, this section pro-
vides that state protection of "activities violating legal or equitable
rights that are not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within
the general scope of copyright." is not preempted.2 4 2 Thus, the states
remain free to protect rights that are not equivalent to those pro-
tected by copyright and, in addition, they may protect noncopyright-
able subject matter. 43
Noncopyrightable subject matter includes works that are not
fixed in any tangible medium of expression. A work is "fixed" if it is
"sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived . . for
a period of more than transitory duration. 2 44 Rights not equivalent
to those granted under copyright law are those that are infringed by
more than the mere act of reproduction, performance, distribution or
display. 45 Thus, if the act of reproduction, performance, distribution
dio and television broadcasts, eliminating the need for common law copyright protection in this
area. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (Supp. V 1981).
239. Id. § 301(a). Section 106 of the Copyright Act provides:
Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this title
has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies of phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public
by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform
the copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the indi-
vidual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the
copyrighted work publicly.
Id. § 106.
240. Id. § 301.
241. Id. § 301(b).
242. Id. § 301(b)(3).
243. Accord Goldstein, note 238 supra, at 1112.
244. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 1981).
245. Id. § 301(b).
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or display is sufficient in itself to infringe upon the state-created
right, then it will apparently be pre-empted. However, if some other
element is required, the state-created right is not considered to be
within the general scope of copyright and, therefore, will not be pre-
empted.2'" Thus, traditional privacy actions are not preempted be-
cause the essence of the tort lies not in the acts of reproduction and
distribution, but in the injury to the plaintiff's right to be left alone.
By the same token, actions which involve deception, misrepresenta-
tion or passing off are not preempted since essential elements are
required in these actions that are not necessary to constitute copy-
right infringement. The same may be true of actions which are anal-
ogous to trademark infringement."7 Viewed in this light, section 301
represents a legislative vindication of Goldstein24'  and Kewanee
Oil."9 State protection of intellectual property interests that are
equivalent to those protected under federal copyright law are pre-
empted because they interfere with the constitutional policy of pro-
viding such protection for only a limited time. Thus, section 301 re-
jects the Sears-Compco theory that all intellectual property not
affirmatively covered by federal patent or copyright law must be left
in the public domain. Instead, section 301 expressly allows the states
to protect property rights, including many forms of publicity rights,
which are not already subject to regulation or protection under the
Copyright Act.
1. Exploitation of Performance Values
It is clear that a performance that is filmed, recorded or
otherwise fixed in a tangible medium of expression by the performer
normally falls within the exclusive purview of federal copyright
law. 50 The status of a live performance, not fixed in any tangible
246. 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[BI[I] at 1-11 (1981). Early versions
of § 301 expressly preserved state remedies for breaches of trust and contract, invasions of
privacy, defamation, and deceptive trade practices such as passing off and false representation.
Prior to final action by the House of Representatives, three additional examples of rights not
equivalent to copyright privileges were added to the original bill: misappropriation, trespass,
and conversion. The Justice Department objected to inclusion of the common law misappropri-
ation action and, subsequently, all of the examples listed in the proposed § 301(b)(3) were
deleted. Id. at 1-13 to .14.1. See also Factors II, 496 F. Supp. 1090, 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
247. Shipley, note 11 supra, at 719-22.
248. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
249. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
250. Section 102 of the Copyright Act of 1976 provides:
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later devel-
oped, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
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medium, is less clear. Arguably, such a performance involves
noncopyrightable subject matter. 51 Perhaps one might contend that
where an entertainer can easily secure copyright protection for his
performance, failure to do so amounts to a dedication of his perform-
ance to the public. This conclusion, however, is at variance with the
Supreme Court's language in Zacchini. Although the preemption is-
sue was not explicitly raised in that case, the Court noted that
Zacchini's claim under a state right of publicity was not preempted
by federal copyright law because he had not filmed his performance,
as he easily could have done, and thereby secured copyright protec-
tion. 52 Recognizing that the right of publicity shares the same
objectives as federal patent and copyright laws, the Court, citing
Goldstein and Kewanee Oil, went on to declare that the Constitution
does not prevent states from also protecting an entertainer's interests
in the value of his performance in order to encourage beneficial pro-
ductivity.23 This observation by the Court suggests that the per-
former may choose between federal and state protection by preserv-
ing, or declining to preserve, his performance in a tangible medium
of expression. 2 In the latter case, the right of publicity fills in the
gap left by copyright law.
2. Exploitation of Recognition Values
The preemption issue is particularly unsettled where recognition
values are involved. For purposes of analysis, it is helpful to distin-
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include
the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
(7) sound recordings.
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend
to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such work.
17 U.S.C. § 102 (Supp. V 1981).
251. 1 M. NIMMER, NiMMER ON COPMUHor § 1.01[B][2][a] at 1-22 (1981).
252. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 557-58 (1977). See
also Note, note 99 supra, at 1193 n.26.
253. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 577 (citing Goldstein. 412 U.S. at 571; Kewanee Oil, 416
U.S. at 470).
254. Of course, it is the plaintiff who must fix the performance in a tangible medium of
expression. It does not matter, as far as preemption is concerned, whether the defendant, as in
Zacchini, fixed the plaintiff's performance.
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guish impersonation situations from -appropriation of a celebrity's
name and likeness. Since performing style and characters created by
an entertainer are usually not copyrightable in and of themselves,
impersonations, such as those which involved Elvis Presley, Laurel
and Hardy, or the Marx Brothers, would probably not fall within the
Act's preemption provisions. One commentator has suggested that if
a performer's style and character creation are viewed as the oral and
visual expression of ideas, then style and character, when developed
to the point of being definable in terms of distinctive dress, manner-
isms, and vocal characteristics, arguably constitute "writings." Al-
though a performer's character or style is not tangible, his perform-
ances can become "works of authorship" fixed by means of films and
tapes.' 55 However, this appears to be a very expansive interpretation
of the term "works of authorship," bearing little resemblance to the
examples given in the Copyright Act itself.' 6
Moreover, even if a court did accept such a broad definition of
"writings," preemption would still be avoided under the non-
equivalent rights theory if the impersonation involved passing off or
other deceptive practices. Such deception would probably be found,
as in Chaplin v. Amador,'5 if the plaintiff was still professionally
active at the time of the impersonation. However, if the performer
being impersonated is dead, as in the case of Elvis Presley or the
Marx Brothers, it is doubtful that a court would conclude that the
impersonation itself was deceptive.258 In that situation a court might
conclude that publicity rights were preempted only by adopting the
tenuous theory that the values appropriated by the defendant can be
regarded as a writing fixed in a tangible medium of expression. In
the absence of the judicial adoption of this theory, however, publicity
rights in impersonation cases would not be pre-empted.
The preemption issue is even more troublesome when recogni-
tion values are appropriated through the use of the plaintiff's name
or likeness. To date only a few courts have considered the preemp-
tion issue in this context. The district court in Price v. Hal Roach
Studios, Inc.259 held that federal copyright laws did not preempt a
255. Shipley, note 11 supra, at 718.
256. These examples include literary, musical, dramatic and choreographic works as well
as art, sculpture, motion pictures and sound recordings. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (Supp. V 1981).
257. 93 Cal. App. 358, 269 P. 544 (Dist. Ct. App. 1928).
258. See, e.g., Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981), where the
court found that the performance itself was not deceptive, although some of the advertising in
connection with the show was misleading. Id. at 1373-75.
259. 400 F. Supp. 836, 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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state-based right of publicity. This conclusion was based on the Su-
preme Court's language in Goldstein; however, the court in Hal
Roach Studios did not explicitly compare the rights protected by the
publicity doctrine to those protected by copyright, nor did it analyze
their respective objectives and available remedies. 6
The preemption issue also arose before the district court in Fac-
tors 11.26 1 The defendant, in an effort to avoid liability for marketing
Elvis Presley posters, contended that Factors could not base its claim
on state publicity rights because they were preempted by federal
copyright law. The court, however, rejected this argument, 62 ini-
tially noting that section 301 did not apply since the cause of action
arose before January 1, 1978, the effective date of the new Copy-
right Act.2' However, the court agreed with Professor Nimmer's
view that the scope of preemption under section 301 was comparable
to that under the 1909 Act as interpreted by Goldstein.2" According
to the Factors II court, the product at issue was a "persona" that
had already been profitably marketed. The "separate and intangible
property right" which could only survive death if exercised by the
celebrity during life, was not equivalent to a copyright.' 5 Accord-
ingly, the court concluded that the right of publicity covered an
"area unattended" by federal law.2 6 On appeal, the Second Circuit
held for the defendant on other grounds and, therefore, did not con-
sider the preemption issue. 26 However, Judge Mansfield, in his dis-
senting opinion, agreed with the lower court's finding that the right
of publicity was not equivalent to any interest within the general
scope of federal copyright law. " "
The district court's reasoning in Factors II is open to criti-
cism. 26  In the case of advertisements where the celebrity is still
alive, the use of the plaintiff's name or likeness suggests an endorse-
ment or an association with the product advertised that is inherently
260. Shipley, note 11 supra. at 698.
261. Factors I, 496 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd 652 F.2d 278 (2d. Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982).
262. Id. at 1097.
263. Id. at 1096. Section 301 (b)(2) provides that nothing in the act "annuls or limits any
rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any state with respect to . . .any
cause of action arising from undertakings commenced before January 1, 1978."
264. 496 F. Supp. at 1099 (citing Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 546, 570. See also I M. NIM-
MER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGfr § 1.01[B] at 1-7 n.22 (1981).
265. 496 F. Supp. at 1099-1100.
266. Id. at 1100.
267. 652 F.2d at 283 n.8.
268. Factors 11, 652 F.2d 278, 289 (2d Cir. 1981) (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
269. See also Shipley, note 11 supra, at 708-09 & n.252.
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deceptive. 70 Consequently, it can be argued that a cause of action
brought under the right of publicity against such conduct is not
equivalent to copyright infringement and thus should not be pre-
empted. The situation is different, however, where posters or
memorabilia are involved. Reproduction, distribution or display of
the plaintiff's likeness by the defendant is the action which gives rise
to liability under state law. Arguably, this is the very same conduct
that is protected against under federal copyright law.
Nevertheless, even if the interest protected by the right of pub-
licity is considered to be equivalent to the interest protected by copy-
right, it is doubtful that the celebrity's identity or "persona"-which
is the essence of the right of publicity-qualifies as a "work of au-
thorship" within the meaning of the Copyright Act. This non-qualifi-
cation, according to Professor Nimmer, prevents a finding of pre-
emption even where a particular aspect of the celebrity's identity is
fixed in a tangible medium of expression such as a drawing or
photograph .
71
Of course, one can argue that a celebrity's "persona" is often an
artificial creation, consciously and carefully developed, having little
to do with the celebrity's natural appearance or personality. Except
where "characters" are concerned, this view cannot be accepted
since recognition values are not independent creations, but instead
are largely derived from the celebrity's previous performances or
achievements. 72
The argument for preemption may be stronger in cases like Lu-
gosi 2 78 where the plaintiff has asserted publicity rights in his likeness
as a particular character. Unlike one's natural likeness, a stage char-
acter is an artificial creation, somewhat resembling a literary charac-
ter. Therefore, one might reasonably contend that at least some
characters would qualify as "writings" and should, therefore, be
treated as copyrightable material. Like cartoon characters, which
are usually regarded as copyrightable,274 the stage character is visu-
270. See also Felcher & Rubin, note 12 supra, at 1600; Treece, note 3 supra, at 644.
271. 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT j 1.01[B][] at 1-14 n.49 (1981).
272. See notes 86-87 supra and accompanying text.
273. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 603 P.2d 425 (1979). See notes 149-53 supra
and accompanying text for a discussion of Lugosi.
274. Walt Disney Prod. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1978). cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979); Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc., 73 F.2d 276,
276-77 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 717 (1935); King Features Syndicate v.
Fleischer, 299 F. 533, 536 (2d Cir. 1924). See also Netterville, Copyright and Tort Aspects of
Parody, Mimicry and Humorous Commentary, 35 S. CAL. L. REV. 225, 240-41 (1962); Note,
The Protection Afforded Literary and Cartoon Characters Through Trade-Mark, Unfair
Competition, and Copyright, 68 HARV. L. REV. 349, 356-60 (1954).
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ally represented. Where, as in Lugosi, the exploitation involved a
stylized depiction of the celebrity's likeness in the guise of a charac-
ter embodied in various fixed media, preemption may be justified.
The general rule, however, should remain one of no preemption.
The preemption provisions of the Copyright Act are quite am-
biguous, and the legislative history of section 301 sheds little light on
congressional intent in this area. Moreover, it is difficult to see any
real conflict between state-created publicity rights and the policies
that underlie federal copyright legislation. Consequently, to the ex-
tent that plaintiff's publicity interests do not fall within the purview
of copyright law, preemption should not apply to the right of
publicity.2
7 5
C. Other Aspects of Federal Preemption
Although state publicity rights do not appear to be expressly
preempted by section 301, the preemption doctrine is still applicable
in situations where there is a direct conflict between publicity rights
and federal copyright policy. For example, an actor who appeared in
a copyrighted motion picture could not assert his right of publicity in
such a way as to prevent the copyright holder from exercising the
usual rights granted by the Copyright Act,2 76 including the right in
some cases to use the actor's name and likeness in derivative
works. 2" A similar conflict would arise if the heirs or assignees of an
actor who appeared in a copyrighted film attempted to assert a right
of publicity in the work after the copyright had expired. This cir-
cumstance would involve a direct clash with federal copyright policy.
The Constitution's copyright clause provides that writings may be
protected only for "limited times' 2 78 and Congress has created the
statutory copyright in return for a subsequent dedication of the work
275. Shipley, note 11 supra, at 714-15.
276. Of course, the performer would normally assign his performance rights to the movie
producer as part of his employment contract. But see Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting
Corp., 299 F.2d 481, 490 (3d Cir.) (telecast of prize fight motion picture without consent held
actionable), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956).
277. According to the new Copyright Act, a "derivative work" is "a work based upon one
or more pre-existing works, such as a translation, fictionalization, motion picture version,
sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a
work may be recast, transformed, or adapted." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 1981). 1 M. NIM-
mER, NIMMER ON CoPYRIGHT § 3.01 (1980). A poster which displays a single frame from a
copyrighted movie would be an example of a derivative work.
278. The Constitution declares that "[t]he Congress shall have Power . . . [tJo promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inven-
tors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONsT. art I, § 8,
cl. 8.
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to the public domain upon expiration of the copyright. Clearly, state
protection of a work after expiration of the federal copyright could
impair this scheme and undermine the policy of allowing everyone to
draw freely upon plots, characters and other material in the public
domain. "' Consequently, the right of publicity should be preempted
in these circumstances.
Another problem is posed by the wide disparities among states
in their treatment of publicity rights. In most instances publicity
rights operate in a national market; yet when viewed from a national
perspective, the law of publicity continues to resemble a "haystack in
a hurricane. ' 28 0 Some states have not yet expressly recognized the
right of publicity. Even more significantly, there is no agreement
among the states as to whether publicity rights survive death, and if
so, for" how long and under what conditions. As the Factors II litiga-
tion illustrates, disputes over post mortem publicity rights give rise to
difficult conflicts of law issues. In Factors II, the court and the par-
ties first assumed that New York law applied. Later, the court deter-
mined that Tennessee law should control since Boxcar was a Tennes-
see corporation, Presley was a Tennessee resident and the contract
between Boxcar and Factors provided for the application of Tennes-
see law.2 81 However, the injury occurred in New York where the sale
of Presley posters took place. The court suggested in dictum, that if
publicity rights had been considered survivable under Tennessee law,
New York law might have been applied to decide if the defendant's
actions were privileged or tortious.2 8'
The issue becomes even more complicated if one considers what
might happen if a California resident, where, as a result of the Lu-
gosi case, post mortem publicity rights are presumably not recog-
nized, assigns his publicity rights to a New York corporation. Under
New York law the right of publicity survives death but, if the assign-
ment contract specifies that New York law will control, will the pub-
licity rights thereby assigned be enforceable against third parties af-
279. Ettore, 229 F.2d at 485.
280. Comment, Copyright Preemption and Character Values: The Paladin Case as an
Extension of Sears and Compco, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1020 (1968).
281. Factors contended.that New York law was applicable as the law of the place of the
wrong. The court, however, concluded that even if New York law might be applicable to deter-
mine if Pro Arts' conduct constituted an infringement of the right of publicity, Tennessee law
must be used to determine whether Boxcar had a right of publicity after Presley's death that
was capable of being contracted for by Factors. 652 F.2d at 280-81. Cf RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 147, comment (i) (1971) (tort conflicts rules apply to issue of
conversion of property, but property conflicts rules apply to whether the plaintiff has title to
the property allegedly converted).
282. 652 F.2d at 281.
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ter the celebrity's death? 8" Assuming that post mortem publicity
rights are valid under New York law, can the assignee of a deceased
New York resident enjoin the sale of infringing merchandise in Cali-
fornia? What would be the effect of an advertisement on national
television that featured an impersonation of a deceased celebrity who
had made an inter vivos assignment of publicity rights? Is the adver-
tiser (or perhaps even the network) liable in New York but not in
California?
The split of authority among the states concerning post mortem
survival of publicity rights significantly undermines the national
market for goods and advertisements featuring the names and like-
nesses of deceased celebrities.'" Therefore, in these circumstances,
the federal government may have the power to regulate the exercise
of publicity rights in order to prevent these conflicts from imposing
an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. Given the fact that
Congress, under the supremacy clause, has the power to occupy the
field to the exclusion of the states, one may ask whether it should do
so. Perhaps the ideal solution is for the states themselves to adopt
uniform legislation aimed at defining the nature, scope and duration
of the right of publicity. However, in view of the widely divergent
positions that the states have taken on the survivability issue, it is
doubtful whether uniform state legislation will be enacted in the
near future. Consequently, some sort of federal response may be nec-
essary. Federal legislation could take one of two routes. The first
response would be to prohibit lawsuits based on state rights of pub-
licity as to goods and property such as radio and television transmis-
sions or motion pictures, which utilize interstate commerce. As a re-
sult, celebrities and their assignees would be effectively restricted to
unfair competition and similar theories as a means of protecting
their economic interests from exploitations by third parties. The
preferable approach would be to establish a federal statutory right of
publicity of limited duration. Although legislation of this sort may be
regarded as an unwarranted intrusion by the federal government into
an area traditionally occupied by the states, it would impose an ele-
ment of rationality, fairness, and consistency upon a body of state
law that thus far has resisted orderly development.
283. Presumably, one of the parties must have some connection with the state whose law
is invoked. The question presented here is whether a California resident can convey something
he does not have in California, although he might have it if he lived somewhere else.
284. Of course, living celebrities can often protect themselves, although not their assign-
ees, by means of unfair competition theories.
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IV. PUBLICITY RIGHTS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The first amendment protects the dissemination of ideas and in-
formation in the form of news, biography, social or political com-
mentary.28 5 Other types of information may also be protected.2 8 The
first amendment also covers artistic expression which is communi-
cated to the public as art, literature or entertainment. 87 Conse-
quently, courts generally look with disfavor upon state action which
seeks to limit free expression.'8s
The United States Supreme Court has often acknowledged the
special role of the press as a medium for the dissemination of ideas
and information to the public, 8 9 and has discouraged governmental
attempts to restrict newsgathering activities. Thus, for example, the
Court struck down laws which prohibited the press from publishing
the names of rape victims 90 or juvenile offenders.291 In these cases,
the Court concluded that the social policies which supported nondis-
closure failed to outweigh the public's right to receive accurate infor-
mation about matters of legitimate public concern."'
The Court has also recognized the need to protect the press
from the consequences of disseminating falsehoods so that it will not
be induced to practice self-censorship or shrink from its role in main-
taining the "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" public debate cen-
tral to the first amendment ."s Thus, in New York Times v. Sulli-
van, 2 the Court declared that a public official could not recover
damages against a media defendant for a defamatory falsehood re-
lating to his official conduct unless he proved that the statement was
made with "actual malice"-that is, with knowledge that it was
285. See. e.g., Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 58 Misc. 2d 1, 294
N.Y.S.2d 122, 127-28 (Sup. Ct., New York County 1968), affd, 32 A.D.2d 892, 301
N.Y.S.2d 948 (1969) (biography).
286. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977) (legal services); Linmark Assoc's v.
Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 91-92 (1977) (real estate); See, e.g., Virginia State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 759-60 (1976) (pre-
scription drugs).
287. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977); Current
Audio, Inc. v. R.C.A. Corp., 71 Misc. 2d 831, 836, 337 N.Y.S.2d 949, 955 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
288. See. e.g., Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283
U.S. 697 (1931).
289. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975).
290. Id. at 496-97.
291. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1979).
292. Id. at 104-05; Cox, 420 U.S. at 495.
293. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1964).
294. Id. at 254.
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false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.290 This
rule was also applied to "public figures," 9" who, by their accom-
plishments, fame, mode of living or calling, give the public a legiti-
mate interest in their activities, affairs or character. 9 v
The actual malice standard was extended to false light privacy
cases by the Court in Time, Inc. v. Hill.298 The plaintiff in Hill and
his family had been held hostage by a group of escaped convicts.
When Life magazine published an article about a successful play
based on the Hill family's experience, it incorrectly stated that
events depicted in accompanying still shots from the play had actu-
ally happened to the Hills. Hill brought suit under the New York
privacy statute claiming that Life's account placed him in a false
light in the public eye. Although the trial court held in the plaintiff's
favor, its decision was reversed by the Supreme Court on appeal.
The Court declared that the New York Times rule was applicable
since the Hill family's experience was a matter of public interest
even though Hill's involvement was admittedly involuntary. Accord-
ingly, the Court held that the plaintiff must prove that Life maga-
zine knew that the statements it published about him were false or
that it acted with reckless disregard of their truth or falsity. 99
Imposition of an "actual malice" requirement on defamation
and false light privacy actions not only demonstrates a strong judi-
cial commitment to ensuring access to a continuing flow of ideas and
information, it also implies that public figures, at least as far as their
dignitary interests are concerned, are not entitled to the same degree
of legal protection as ordinary persons. Having sought and achieved
wealth, power or status, celebrities must also accept the disadvan-
295. Id. at 279-80.
296. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
297. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). For a while, it appeared
that the New York Times rule might be extended to plaintiffs who involuntarily became in-
volved in matters of public interest. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43
(1971) (victim of police raid held to be a public figure). This view, however, was repudiated by
the Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). According to Gertz, the state
courts are free to define an appropriate standard of liability for a publisher of defamatory
falsehood where a private individual is injured, as long as they do not impose strict liability on
the defendant. Id. at 347. Furthermore, an injured party is not to be regarded as a public
figure simply because he is involuntarily involved in a matter of general or public interest. Id.
at 346. See also Time, Inc, v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454-55 (1976) (socially prominent
woman involved in divorce proceeding not a public figure).
298. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
299. Id. at 390-91. At the present time, however, it is unclear whether the Hill case has
been implicitly overruled by Gertz where private persons are harmed. See Frakt, Defamation
Since Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.: The Emerging Common Law, 10 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 519, 533
n.82 (1979); Note, Defamation, Privacy and the First Amendment, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1016,
1019.
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tages of being in the public eye.300
A. Appropriation and the Right of Publicity
The exploitation of publicity rights by performers and celebri-
ties also limits some forms of expression, thereby coming into poten-
tial conflict with the first amendment. To the extent that publicity
interests are purely economic, they are weaker than and should be
subordinate to the first amendment interest in public information
and education. However, the actual malice test of New York Times
and Hill is not directly applicable to publicity cases because, with
the possible exception of fictionalized portrayals of celebrities, the
truth or falsity of the defendant's publication is not at issue. On the
other hand, appropriation of name and likeness is somewhat similar
to the right of publicity as far as its impact on free expression is
concerned.3 0 1 In fact, some courts have treated appropriation and
publicity cases alike for first amendment purposes when celebrities
relied on both theories in the same cause of action. 02 Appropriation
cases decided under the New York privacy statute03 are especially
useful. In general, the courts in these cases have distinguished use of
performance or recognition values to promote the dissemination of
information and ideas from use for "advertising purposes" or for
"purposes of trade." The former category is treated as protected
speech while the latter category is not. This distinction between in-
formative uses and commercial uses can arguably be applied to pub-
licity rights cases as well. In fact, courts have often relied upon the
reasoning of these appropriation cases when called upon to resolve
similar controversies over publicity rights.3 4 For this reason, appro-
300. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
301. See Note, note 132 supra, at 550.
302. Ann-Margret v. High Society Magazine, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1980);
Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp.
876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, 58 Misc. 2d 1, 294 N.Y.S.2d
122 (Sup. Ct., New York County 1968), affd, 32 A.D.2d 892, 301 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1969).
303. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 1976). According to the New York
statute:
Any person whose name, portrait or picture is used within this state for advertis-
ing purposes or for the purposes of trade without the written consent first obtained
as above provided may maintain an equitable action in the supreme court of this
state against the person, firm or corporation so using his name, portrait or picture,
to prevent and restrain the use thereof; and may also sue and recover damages for
any injuries sustained by reason of such use and if the defendant shall have know-
ingly used such person's name, portrait or picture in such manner as is forbidden
or declared to be unlawful by the last section, the jury, in its discretion, may
award exemplary damages.
304. See, e.g., Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1978);
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priation cases and publicity rights decisions will be discussed to-
gether in this section.
Factually, these cases seem to fall into four categories: news and
information about matters of public interest, fiction and fictionalized
portrayals of celebrities, impersonations of celebrities, and advertis-
ing and memorabilia.
1. News and Information About Matters of Public Interest
Free expression serves a number of socially useful functions.
Without question, the most important of these functions is to help
maintain the viability of our political system.305 In the words of one
commentator, "[s]elf-government can exist only insofar as voters ac-
quire the intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to
the general welfare that, in theory, casting a ballot is assumed to
express."30 Since the free flow of information to members of society
must be maintained if the goals of democratic government are to be
achieved,307 works or activities that disseminate information or ideas
should receive considerable protection against the claims of private
interests.308
Recognizing the overriding nature of the public's right to infor-
mation about matters of current interest, the courts in appropriation
cases have generally allowed the media to use a person's name or
picture without liability in connection with a legitimate news
event.8 09 This principle is known as the "newsworthiness" or public
interest privilege and, while particularly broad in its application to
public figures, also extends to situations where private persons are
involved in newsworthy events. 810 Thus, recovery for invasion of pri-
vacy was denied where a newspaper published the plaintiff's photo-
graph in connection with an account of her father's arrest.3 ' A pho-
Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, 58 Misc. 2d 1, 4-5, 294 N.Y.S.2d 122, 129 (Sup.
Ct., New York County 1968), a~fd. 32 A.D.2d 892, 301 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1969).
305. A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF GOVERNMENT 1-27
(1948); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. i, 26
(1971); Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment. 72 YALE L.J. 877, 878-
86 (1963).
306. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245, 255.
307. See Comment, The First Amendment Privilege and Public Disclosure of Private
Facts, 25 CATH. U.L. REv. 271, 277 (1976).
308. See Note, note 184 supra. at 769.
309. See Pipel, The Right of Publicity, 27 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 249, 257 (1980).
310. E.g., Cohn v. National Broadcasting Co., 67 A.D.2d 140, 143, 414 N.Y.S.2d 906,
908 (1979). (Roy Cohn, an associate of Senator Joseph McCarthy, not allowed to recover
against NBC for portrayal of him by actor in television drama about McCarthy).
311. Hillman v. Star Publishing Co., 64 Wash. 691, 694-96, 117 P. 594, 596 (1911).
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tograph taken in the courtroom of the parties in a divorce proceeding
was also held to be newsworthy,81 as was a picture of a public offi-
cial with his arm around the captured John Dillinger. 13 The courts
have also refused to hold a newspaper liable for a report of the plain-
tiff's conviction for engaging in an illegal drag races1 4 or for a news
story about a twelve-year old girl having a baby."18
The newsworthiness privilege is not limited to "news," in the
sense of current events, but applies to any factual account as long as
the story is accurate and deals with a matter of public interest. 1
For example, the use of the plaintiff's name or incidents from his
life, in connection with a biography, is privileged as long as the ac-
count is substantially correct. In Rosemont Enterprises v. Random
House,81 7 a corporation formed by Howard Hughes to produce his
biography sued to prevent the publication of the book Howard
Hughes by John Keats. The court held that biographical works were
not commercial uses and, therefore, were beyond the purview of both
the New York privacy statute and the right of publicity.8 18 Address-
ing the right of publicity issue, the court declared that the "same
requirement of commercial use which limits the New York right of
privacy inheres in the right of publicity." 8 9
It has been said that the newsworthiness or public interest privi-
lege "extends far beyond the dissemination of news in the sense of
current events and includes. . even entertainment and amusement,
concerning interesting phases of human activity in general."32 0 This
312. Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957, 961 (D. Minn. 1948).
313. Estill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 186 F.2d 1017, 1022 (7th Cir. 1951).
314. Coverstone v. Davies, 38 Cal. 2d 315, 322-23, 239 P.2d 876, 880-81, (1952).
315. Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330, 338, 95 S.E.2d 606, 610 (1956).
316. Thus, for example, recovery was denied in Klein v. McGraw-Hill, 263 F. Supp. 919
(D.D.C. 1966). In that case, the plaintiff, a high school student, who made an important con-
tribution to radio communication in connection with the operation of amateur radio equipment
in his home, received an award from MIT and a great deal of attendant publicity. The defen-
dant published his picture in a textbook, Understanding Radio, along with an account of the
plaintiff's achievement. Holding for the defendant, the court concluded that the plaintiff's ac-
tivities were a genuine matter of public interest. Id. at 921-22.
317. 58 Misc. 2d 1, 294 N.Y.S.2d 122 (Sup. Ct., New York County 1968), affld, 32
A.D.2d 892, 301 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1969).
318. Id. at 7, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 129. The same result was reached in Koussevitzky v.
Allen, Towne & Health, 188 Misc. 479, 484, 68 N.Y.S.2d 779, 783-84 (Sup. Ct., New York
County 1947), aff'd, 272 A.D. 759, 69 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1947), where a prominent orchestra
conductor sought to enjoin the publication of an unauthorized biography. The court, denying
recovery, pointed out that the plaintiff was a public figure and that the book dealt largely with
his musical career which was a matter of public interest. Id.
319. 58 Misc. at 6, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 129.
320. Current Audio, Inc. v. RCA Corp., 71 Misc. 2d 881, 886, 337 N.Y.S.2d 949, 955
(Sup. Ct., New York County 1972).
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is illustrated by Ann-Margret v. High Society Magazine, Inc.32 1 In
that case High Society Magazine published a semi-nude photograph
of the actress in a feature entitled High Society Celebrity Skin. The
photograph was taken from a movie, Magic, in which Ann-Margret
had appeared. The plaintiff brought suit against the magazine, alleg-
ing both violation of the New York privacy statute and infringement
upon her right of publicity. The court remarked that "when an indi-
vidual consents to be viewed in a certain manner during the course
of a public performance, such as in a movie, it cannot then be ar-
gued that subsequent faithful reproduction . ..of that appearance
constitutes an invasion of privacy."8 2 Moreover, according to the
court, publication of the offending photograph in the defendant's
magazine was not considered "advertising" for "purposes of trade"
within the meaning of the privacy statute since the nude appearance
of Ann-Margret in a movie was a newsworthy event."2 ' The court
added that a right of publicity, if recognized under New York law,
could only be asserted against commercial uses, as was the case with
the statutory right of privacy. 2 Recovery was therefore denied on
both counts.
Although reports of newsworthy events are privileged, a pub-
lisher may not appropriate the plaintiff's recognition values merely to
draw attention to an unrelated article. Thus in Grant v. Esquire,
Inc., 25 the defendant was found liable for publishing an article on
clothing styles in which Cary Grant's head was superimposed on the
torso of a model. Grant had posed for pictures in 1946 for Esquire in
connection with an article about clothing tastes and habits of
Hollywood stars, but the offending article, published some twenty-
five years later, had nothing to do with the plaintiff. Grant brought
suit on the basis of libel, invasion of privacy and interference with
the right of publicity. Overruling the defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment, the court held that the plaintiff's complaint stated a
321. 498 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
322. Id. at 405.
323. Id. See also Goelet v. Confidential, Inc., 5 A.D.2d 226, 171 N.Y.S.2d 223 (1958).
In the Goelet case, the plaintiffs, an actor and his actress wife, alleged that Confidential Mag-
azine had published an article about highly intimate details of their lives for the primary
purpose of amusing and astonishing the public. Even though Confidential Magazine might not
be considered as a "vehicle of information" by many persons, the court denied recovery be-
cause the plaintiffs were public figures and, therefore, legitimate objects of public curiosity. As
the court observed, celebrity status "places one's activities in the pitiless light of publicity and
renders him a legitimate item of news." Id. at 228, 171 N.Y.S.2d at 225.
324. 498 F. Supp. at 406-07.
325. 367 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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cause of action under both the privacy and publicity theories. 3ss In
addition, the court rejected the defendant's contention that the mag-
azine article was privileged under the first amendment.37 The use of
Grant's picture contributed nothing to the informational content of
the article but deprived the plaintiff of a valuable economic right.
This, the court noted, was a commercial use of Grant's picture: "Mr.
Grant's face serves no function but to attract attention to the article.
Presumably the model who posed for the torso got a professional fee
for his part in the enterprise. The question presented is whether Es-
quire had the right to compel Mr. Grant to contribute his face for
free.
28
Information, of course, can be disseminated not only for printed
media such as newspapers, books and magazines,2 but also by radio
and television broadcasts or motion pictures. Consequently, depic-
tions of actual events in these media are also privileged.3 80 However,
where performance values rather than publicity values are involved,
the courts apparently are willing to extend more protection to the
entertainer under the publicity rights theory than under the right of
326. Id. at 884-85. The court found that the magazine article was not defamatory and,
therefore, dismissed the libel action. Id. at 878.
327. Id. at 882.
328. Id. at 878. A similar result was reached in Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723
(S.D.N.Y. 1978), a publicity rights case where the defendant published a drawing in its maga-
zine of a nude black man seated in the corner of a boxing ring. The court found that the
picture, which accompanied an unrelated doggerel poem, was merely intended to attract atten-
tion to the article and had no connection with a legitimate newsworthy event. Id. at 727. See
also Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publishing, 496 F. Supp. 1105, 1110 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (plaintiff,
incorrectly identified as participant in "orgy" depicted in defendant's magazine with intent to
make commercial use of plaintiff's name, held to have a cause of action under New York
privacy statute). New York courts have, however, sometimes allowed the news media to use a
person's picture for illustrative purposes in connection with a related news story even though
he is not the subject of the article. See, e.g.. Murray v. New York Magazine, 27 N.Y.2d 406,
267 N.E.2d 256, 318 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1971), in which a freelance photographer took Murray's
picture as he watched a Manhattan St. Patrick's Day parade wearing an "Irish" hat, green tie,
and green pin. The defendant purchased the photograph and used it two years later on a
magazine cover in connection with an article by Jimmy Breslin entitled The Last of the Irish
Immigrants. Although the article neither named the plaintiff, nor referred to the cover picture,
the court felt that the relationship was close enough for the public interest privilege to apply.
Id. at 409, 267 N.E.2d at 258, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 476-770. Accord Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, Inc.,
162 Misc. 776, 782-83, 295 N.Y.S. 382, 389 (Sup. Ct., New York County 1937) (use of
Hindu musician's photograph in article about Hindu rope trick does not state a cause of action
under New York privacy statute).
329. Even cartoons have been treated as privileged. Thus, the defendant was privileged to
depict in cartoon form the plaintiff's efforts to aid the victims of an airplane which had crashed
into the Empire State Building. Molony v. Boy Comics Publishers, 277 A.D. 166, 98 N.Y.S.2d
119 (1950).
330. Sweenek v. Pathe News, 16 F. Supp. 746 (E.D.N.Y. 1936); Humiston v. Universal
Film Mfg. Co., 189 A.D. 46, 178 N.Y.S. 752 (1919).
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privacy. Thus, in Man v. Warner Brothers, Inc.,"'1 an appropriation
case, the court denied recovery to a musician whose forty-five second
rendition of Mess Hall on the flugel-horn at the Woodstock Festival
was portrayed in the defendant's documentary about Woodstock.
The court noted that the first amendment privilege applied to com-
mercial films.83 ' The plaintiff's performance was certainly a matter
of public interest as one of the events that took place at
Woodstock.83
In contrast to the Man decision, the United States Supreme
Court, in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,3 4 re-
stricted the scope of the newsworthiness privilege in situations where
the performance values were appropriated by the news media. The
plaintiff in Zacchini brought suit against a local television station
when it broadcast his fifteen-second "human cannonball" act on its
evening news program. Reversing the Ohio Supreme Court, which
had held that the news media could photograph Zacchini's perform-
ance because it was a newsworthy event,335 the United States Su-
preme Court ruled that the first amendment did not permit the de-
fendant to broadcast Zacchini's "entire act."' ' The Court began by
rejecting the actual malice standard of Time, Inc. v. Hill,37 conclud-
ing that the right of publicity was substantially different from the
false light privacy tort involved in Hill.338 This conclusion followed
from two assumptions. First, performers, unlike plaintiffs in false
light cases, did not desire to suppress public scrutiny of newsworthy
331. 317 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
332. Id. at 52. The court in Man also cited Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 278 A.D. 431,
106 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1951), for the proposition that one who gives a public performance cannot
base a claim on invasion of privacy. 317 F. Supp. at 53. Although the court went on to discuss
the first amendment issue, it can be argued that the court's conclusion on that issue was not
the basis for the holding in the case.
333. 317 F. Supp. at 53. Summary judgment for the defendant in a privacy action, how-
ever, was reversed in Taggart v. Wadleigh-Maurice, Ltd., 489 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1973), an-
other case involving the Woodstock movie. In that case, the plaintiff was photographed servic-
ing latrines at the Woodstock Festival. The defendant recorded a conversation with him and
later edited it in order to achieve a comic effect at the plaintiff's expense. The court distin-
guished between a privileged action, such as photographing the plaintiff as he went about his
business, and "deliberately draw[ing] him out in conversation for the purpose of making him
an inadvertant performer in a sequence intended to be exploited for its artistic effect." Id. at
438.
334. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
335. 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 351 N.E.2d 454 (1976). For a discussion of the Ohio court's
opinion in Zacchinl, see Note, Performer's Right of Publicity: A Limitation on News Privi-
lege, 26 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 587, 588-89 (1977). See also Comment, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 786
(1977).
336. 433 U.S. at 575.
337. 385 U.S. 374, 390-91 (1967).
338. 433 U.S. at 572-73.
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activity but merely wished to be paid for it.3-9 Second, there were
alternative modes of expression available to the press and, therefore,
appropriating Zacchini's performance was not necessary in order to
inform the public about it. 40 Additionally, the Court observed that
the defendant's broadcast posed a substantial threat to the economic
value of Zacchini's performance because the public would hardly
pay to watch the plaintiff's human cannonball act if it could see the
performance for nothing. According to the Court, this went to the
heart of Zacchini's ability to make a living as an entertainer. 4'
The right of publicity provided an economic incentive for
Zacchini and others to make the necessary investment in time and
resources to produce a performance of interest to the public. In the
Court's opinion, the "incentive rationale" which lies behind the right
of publicity is similar to the policy of encouraging creative endeavors
upon which patent and copyright laws are based. Just as this objec-
tive justified restrictions on the flow of information by virtue of the
protection extended to patent and copyright holders, so also would it
permit the states to protect the performer under the publicity rights
concept.3 2 Accordingly, the Court declared that the first amendment
interest of the media was not sufficient to prevent a state, if it chose
to do so, from prohibiting the defendant from broadcasting
Zacchini's entire act, notwithstanding the newsworthy nature of his
performance.Ms
Justice Powell, in a dissenting opinion, concluded that the press
could appropriate any portion or all of a performance so long as it
broadcast the performance as part of its routine news programs,
rather than as commercial entertainment.3 4 This approach seem-
339. Id. at 573. In other words, the Court assumed that even if broadcast were essential
to public debate on a newsworthy topic, the performer's willingness to bargain for an author-
ized broadcast of his act undercut the need for constitutional protection. This assumption,
however, might not always be correct since the money a broadcaster may be willing to pay
may not be enough to offset the loss of revenue from paying customers to a live performance.
See Note, note 99 supra, at 1185.
340. 433 U.S. at 574. It is, of course, questionable whether a verbal description of
Zacchini's act would be nearly as effective as a motion picture recording of it. See Note, State
"Copyright" Protection for Performers: The First Amendment Question, 1978 DUKE L.J.
1198, 1225-26. More importantly, according to one commentator, permitting the plaintiff to
restrict the medium of communication might seriously impair the public access to a critical
evaluation of the act. See Note, note 99 supra at 1199-1201.
341. 443 U.S. at 576.
342. Id. See also Note, note 148 supra, at 624-25.
343. 433 U.S. at 575. On remand, the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the defendant
had no constitutional right to broadcast the performance, and sent the case back to the trial
court for a determination of whether Zacchini's right of publicity had been invaded. 54 Ohio
St. 2d 286, 376 N.E.2d 582 (1978).
344. 433 U.S. at 581 (Powell, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the "routine news"
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ingly represented an attempt to recast the traditional newsworthiness
privilege into a form that would be more appropriate to a perform-
ance rights situation.
The majority opinion in Zacchini has been generally criticized
by legal commentators. Perhaps the greatest problem with the "en-
tire act" test is its vagueness. 3 "' For example, it is not clear whether
a discrete unit that is part of a larger whole, would be considered an
entire act. In addition, the entire act standard provides very little
guidance about the scope of first amendment protection when some-
thing less than an entire act is appropriated. Moreover, the test can-
not be applied beyond the performance situation."' As the Zacchini
Court suggested, protecting the economic rights of performers will
ultimately increase the level of entertainment available to the public,
thereby advancing first amendment objectives.347 Comparable pro-
tection of recognition values, however, does not provide the same sort
of motivation to produce additional things of value to society." 8 The
social interest that justifies the protection of performance values,
therefore, does not necessarily justify recognition of a celebrity's
right to exploit his name and likeness. The majority opinion in
Zacchini simply does not. address itself to this issue.
The "routine news" test of Justice Powell has received more
favorable comment," '4 but it is not entirely satisfactory either. The
distinction between routine news and commercial entertainment is
difficult to maintain since many news shows are highly commercial-
ized and entertainment-oriented.350 Conversely, many types of com-
mercial programming, such as sports telecasts, have "news" seg-
ments. Thus, in theory, if filmed sports highlights were broadcast on
both a local evening news program and a commercial sports pro-
gram, the former use would be protected under the "routine news"
test while the latter might not be protected, though the two uses
convey the same information and respond to the same audience
interest. 351
It can be argued that Zacchini and Man are not entirely incon-
sistent. In Zacchini, the plaintiff's living was based entirely on his
approach, see Note, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARv. L. REV. 70, 213-14 (1977).
345. Comment, supra note 120, at 825-27.
346. Comment, supra note 41, at 606.
347. 433 U.S. at 575-76.
348. See Note, note 340 supra, at 1222.
349. See, e.g., Note, note 344 supra, at 213-14.
350. See Note, note 335 supra, at 694.
351. See Note, note 99 supra, at 1205.
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human cannonball act. The television station not only filmed his en-
tire act, but broadcast it while Zacchini was still performing at the
fair. Thus, the plaintiff could plausibly contend, as the Court con-
cluded, that the news broadcast directly threatened his ability to
make a living as a performer. On the other hand, the plaintiff in
Man gave a brief and spontaneous performance. Even though the
plaintiff was a professional musician, the Woodstock movie could
hardly have reduced popular demand for his services and interfered
in any way with his ability to make a living as a musician. Moreover,
the plaintiff's performance was a brief, almost incidental, portion of
a two-hour movie, which the court characterized as de minimis3 2
2. Fiction and Fictionalized Portrayals of Celebrities
Another purpose of free expression is to communicate and ex-
pand our cultural experience.353 Therefore, first amendment protec-
tion may extend to works that are entertaining as well as informa-
tive, not only because they frequently contribute something to the
marketplace of ideas, but also because they are legitimate forms of
expression in their own right.'" Thus, fiction writers who loosely
base their characters or plots on actual persons or events are usually
protected as long as their portrayals are not false or defamatory. For
example, the court refused to find liability under the New York pri-
vacy statute against John Hersey for basing the character of Major
Victor Joppolo in A Bell for Adano on the plaintiff, Toscani.3 5 In
addition, at least in New York, incidental mention of actual persons
in works of fiction for the purpose of adding verisimilitude to the
story is likewise privileged. The same privilege would no doubt apply
in other jurisdictions."6
Docudramas and fictionalized accounts of actual events are
more difficult to fit into the scheme of first amendment protection.
Although the courts have traditionally treated straightforward dram-
352. Man, 317 F. Supp. at 53.
353. See Felcher & Rubin, note 12 supra, at 1597.
354. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977);
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952).
355. Toscani v. Hersey, 271 A.D. 445, 448, 65 N.Y.S.2d 814, 817-18 (1946).
356. See Ladany v. William Morrow & Co., 465 F. Supp. 870, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(reference to member of Israeli Olympic Team in book about 1972 terrorist attack in Munich
held to be incidental use); Damron v. Doubleday, Doran & Co., 133 Misc. 302, 303, 231
N.Y.S. 444, 446 (Sup. Ct., New York County 1928) (no recovery for incidental mention of
plaintiff's name in the novel, Showboat), affd, 226 A.D. 796, 234 N.Y.S. 773 (1929).
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atization or recital of actual events as privileged a5 7 they are less
likely to afford protection to the portrayal of speculative or imagi-
nary thoughts or events.358 Although these productions contain ideas
and information, their primary purpose is entertainment. It has been
suggested that, where a publisher blends fact and fiction, his primary
purpose is to increase circulation. If this commercial purpose is
viewed as outweighing any intent to disseminate information, one
can perhaps contend that the portrayal is more of a commercial
product than a literary creation. 59
The leading case under the New York privacy statute, Binns v.
Vitagraph Co. of America,3 60 reflected this view. The defendant pro-
duced a motion picture which portrayed the plaintiff, Binns, a hero
of a marine disaster which had recently been in the news. The court
observed that while the movie plot was based on an actual event, it
did not contain "true pictures of a current event but [was] mainly
the product of the imagination. " 86 1 Accordingly, the court concluded
that the defendant had appropriated the plaintiff's name and likeness
for purposes of trade and allowed recovery under the New York pri-
vacy statute.3 62
Even today, when a fictionalized portrayal masquerades as fact,
courts are unwilling to treat it as protected speech. Instead, at least
under the New York privacy statute, courts have invoked the actual
malice test of Time, Inc. v. HillP3 to determine if liability shall be
357. In Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prod's, 25 Cal. 3d 860, 603 P.2d 454, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 352 (1979), Chief Justice Bird, in a concurring opinion, declared:
Contemporary events, symbols and people are regularly used in fictional works.
Fiction writers may be able to more persuasively, more accurately express them-
selves by weaving into the tale persons or events familiar to their readers. The
choice is theirs. No author should be forced into creating mythological worlds or
characters wholly divorced from reality.
Id. at 869, 603 P.2d at 460, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 358 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
358. Youssoupoff v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys's, Inc., 41 Misc. 2d 42, 244 N.Y.S.2d
701 (Sup. Ct., New York County 1963) (no liability for portrayal of Prince Youssoupoff, the
killer of Rasputin, in dramatic play about Rasputin's death), affd. 19 A.D.2d. 865, 244
N.Y.S.2d 1 (1963).
359. Even greater conflicts between private rights and first amendment considerations are
posed by "psycho-biography" and "psycho-history," that is, reconstruction of the thoughts and
psychological character of historical figures. See generally Silver, Libel, the "Higher Truths"
of Art, and the First Amendment, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1065 (1978).
360. See, e.g., Varnish v. Best Medium Publishing Co., 405 F.2d 608, 612 (2d Cir. 1968)
(magazine article about woman who killed herself and her three children falsely implied that
husband was insensitive), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 987 (1969); Annerino v. Dell Publishing Co.,
17 Ill. App. 2d 205, 208-09, 149 N.E.2d 761, 762-63 (1958) (use of photograph of slain po-
liceman's wife in connection with sensationalized story about policeman's killer).
361. 210 N.Y. 51, 103 N.E. 1108 (1913).
362. Id. at 56, 103 N.E. at 1110.
363. 385 U.S. 37., (1967).
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imposed on the publisher or producer. The leading case is Spahn v.
Julian Messner, Inc.,3 " which involved a fictionalized biography of
baseball pitcher, Warren Spahn. The Spahn court held that true bi-
ography was completely protected by the first amendment but that a
substantially false biography was only partially protected-the de-
fendant would be held liable if he published with knowledge of its
falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth.365 Applying this stan-
dard, the New York Court of Appeals allowed the plaintiff to re-
cover because the biography contained "gross errors of fact and 'all-
pervasive distortions, inaccuracies, invented dialogue, and the narra-
tion of happenings out of context.' "866
Can the court's analysis in Spahn be applied to cases which in-
volve the right of publicity? Spahn was essentially a false light pri-
vacy case; although the defendant's biography was offensive, it ap-
parently did not impair Spahn's economic interests. Because of the
similarity between false light privacy and libel, it seemed appropriate
to apply the New York Times actual malice standard in Spahn;
however, as previously noted, publicity cases are clearly distinguisha-
ble from either of these torts.
Although no cases have yet been decided where a publicity
rights claim was asserted against the publisher for a false and decep-
tive portrayal of a celebrity, the following analysis is suggested as a
way of dealing with such a case. Not every false portrayal, even
when made with actual malice, should give rise to a cause of action
based on the right of publicity. Relief should be granted under a
publicity rights theory only when the plaintiff can demonstrate an
economic injury, otherwise he should be restricted to a false light
privacy action. Economic injury may be shown, for example, when
an unflattering portrayal causes the public to think less of the plain-
tiff and this loss of "good will" reduces demand for endorsements or
memorabilia featuring the celebrity. Once a prima facie case is
made out in this fashion, the court must then address itself to the
privilege issue. As in false light cases like Spahn, one can argue that
honest mistakes and perhaps even negligent acts should be protected
in order to avoid the "chilling effect" of self-censorship. On the other
hand, there is little justification for shielding deliberate or reckless
364. 18 N.Y.2d 324, 221 N.E.2d 543, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877, (1966), vacated, 387 U.S. 239
(1967), affid on remand, 20 N.Y.2d 752, 229 N.E.2d 712, 283 N.Y.S.2d 119, on reargument,
21 N.Y.2d 124, 233 N.E.2d 840, 286 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1968), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 1046
(1969).
365. 21 N.Y.2d at 127, 233 N.E.2d at 842, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 834.
366. 21 N.Y.2d at 127, 233 N.E.2d at 842, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 835.
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falsifications which not only injure the plaintiff but also deceive the
public. Consequently, it can be argued that the boundary between
protected and nonprotected speech reflected by the actual malice
standard can, at least in some circumstances, be properly applied to
publicity as well as false light privacy cases.
The courts, however, have shown more tolerance for docu-
dramas and other portrayals of celebrities which do not purport to be
completely factual.3 7 Where the account is an avowed fictionaliza-
tion, courts seem willing to treat it like any other type of fiction. For
example, in Frosch v. Gosset & Dunlap,3 8 the estate of Marilyn
Monroe sued the publishers of Norman Mailer's biography of the
actress. The plaintiffs invoked both the statutory right of privacy and
the right of publicity. The trial court dismissed the complaint.36 9 The
appellate court upheld the dismissal of the privacy claim on the
grounds that only living persons could maintain an action under the
privacy statute.3 70 The appellate court also affirmed the trial court's
dismissal of the publicity action.3 7' The parties disagreed over
whether the biography was factual or fictional, but the court de-
clared that it would be privileged as a "literary work" in either
event.3
7'
A similar conclusion was reached in Hicks v. Casablanca
Records.7M The Hicks case involved an attempt by the heirs and
assignees of mystery writer Agatha Christie to enjoin the defendants
from distributing the motion picture Agatha. The plaintiffs also
sought to prevent another defendant, Ballantine Books, from selling
copies of the novel Agatha. Both the book and the movie involved a
fictionalized account of Agatha Christie's eleven day disappearance
in 1926, portraying her as an emotionally unstable woman, who en-
gaged in a sinister plot to murder her husband's mistress in order to
regain his affections. The court noted that "books and movies are
vehicles through which ideas and opinions are disseminated and, as
such, have enjoyed certain constitutional protections, not generally
367. See, e.g., Cohn v. National Broadcasting Co., 67 A.D.2d 140, 414 N.Y.S.2d 906
(1979) (Tail Gunner Joe); Wojtowicz v. Delacorte Press, 58 A.D.2d 45, 395 N.Y.S.2d 205
(1977) (Dog Day Afternoon), a~fd. 43 N.Y.2d 858, 374 N.E.2d 129, 403 N.Y.S.2d 218
(1978).
368. 75 A.D.2d 768, 427 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1980).
369. Id. at 769, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 829.
370. Id. at 768-69, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 829.
371. Id. at 768, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 829.
372. Id. at 769, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 829.
373. 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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accorded 'merchandise'. 13 74 Acknowledging that there were no deci-
sions on point involving publicity rights, the court turned to the pri-
vacy cases for guidance. The first case it examined was Spahn v.
Julian Messner, Inc., 8  which had declared that "matters of news
history, biography and other factual subjects of public interest" did
not fall within the purview of the New York privacy statute even
though the defendant made "necessary references to the names, por-
traits, identities, or histories of living persons. '" 76 The court in Hicks
held that the same privileges and exemptions engrafted upon the pri-
vacy statute by Spahn also applied to publicity rights.17
The court in Hicks, however, found that the biography privilege
did not apply to Agatha because it was a fictionalization, not a fac-
tual biography.378 At the same time the court distinguished Spahn,
which had held for the plaintiff, on the basis that the book in ques-
tion was a deliberate falsification of the plaintiff's life, while Agatha
was an avowed fictionalization. Because the false light element that
figured in the Spahn case was absent in Hicks, the court looked to
another New York privacy case, University of Notre Dame Du Lac
v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.3 79 The Notre Dame case in-
volved the movie John Goldfarb, Please Come Home, a comedy in
which a football team, identified as that of Notre Dame, appeared.
The court found for the defendant since the events portrayed in the
movie were not represented as being true and that a viewer of the
film would certainly know that they were fictitious. 38 0 Relying on the
reasoning in the Notre Dame case, the court in Hicks concluded that
the avowedly fictionalized account of Agatha Christie's celebrated
disappearance was similarly privileged under the first amendment
and, therefore, the defendants were not liable for appropriating her
publicity rights."' 1
374. Id. at 430.
375. 23 A.D.2d 216, 260 N.Y.S.2d 451 (1965), aF'd, 18 N.Y.2d 324, 221 N.E.2d 543,
274 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1966), judgment vacated. 387 U.S. 239 (1967), afd on remand, 20
N.Y.2d 752, 233 N.E.2d 840, 286 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 1046
(1969). For a discussion of the Spahn case, see notes 301-03 supra and accompanying text.
376. 23 A.D.2d at 216, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 453.
377. 464 F. Supp. at 430.
378. Id. at 431.
379. 22 A.D.2d 452, 256 N.Y.S.2d 301, affd, 15 N.Y.2d 940, 207 N.E.2d 508, 259
N.Y.S.2d 832 (1965).
380. Id. at 455, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 304-05.
381. See also Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 603 P.2d 454, 160
Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979). Although the court refused to find that a right of publicity had been
established, Chief Justice Bird noted that the movie in question, Legend of Valentino: A Ro-
mantic Fiction, would probably be privileged. Id. at 867-68, 603 P.2d at 459, 160 Cal. Rptr. at
357, (Bird, C.J., concurring).
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Frosch, Hicks and the other fictionalization cases are correct
even though one might argue that there may be little difference be-
tween covert falsification in the manner of Spahn and avowed falsifi-
cation as illustrated by Frosch or Hicks. Each type of publication
reveals the sort of imagination and creativity that might justify first
amendment protection, while each displays the same capacity to un-
dermine publicity values.3 82 However, there is also a critical differ-
ence between the two classes of publication: in one instance the pub-
lic is deceived, while in the other it is entertained. There is
considerable social value in entertainment, but there is none in de-
ception. Thus, the public interest that supports first amendment pro-
tection in cases of avowed fictionalization, is absent where fiction is
passed off as truth.
3. Impersonations of Celebrities
As discussed earlier, impersonations of celebrities involve an ap-
propriation of both performance values and recognition values. Two
publicity rights cases, Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. v. Night &
Day Co.883 and Estate of Presley v. Russen,s" were decided in 1981
by federal district courts, which held that impersonations did not
qualify as protected speech.3 8 Groucho Marx Productions involved
an'impersonation of the Marx Brothers by actors in the play A Day
in Hollywood/A Night in the Ukraine. The defendants contended
that the first amendment protected dramatic performances of liter-
ary works such as their play. While acknowledging that entertain-
ment enjoys some first amendment protection, the court declared
that the purpose or function of the entertainment must be scruti-
nized to determine whether it infringed upon the plaintiff's right of
publicity." 6 According to the court, works designed primarily to pro-
mote the dissemination of ideas or information through news or
fictionalization are regarded as protected expression; however, works
which make use of the plaintiffs name or likeness for commercial
purposes, such as the sale of merchandise, fall outside the scope of
any first amendment protection. 87 The court in Groucho Marx Pro-
382. It may be argued that no harm is done to the plaintiff's reputation or his publicity
values in cases of avowed fictionalization because the public has no reason to take the por-
trayal seriously. Human nature, however, undermines this proposition's accuracy.
383. 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
384. 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981).
385. Groucho Marx, 523 F. Supp. at 493; Presley, 513 F. Supp. at 1359.
386. 523 F. Supp. at 492.
387. Id.
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ductions rejected the notion that the play could be interpreted as a
biographical sketch of the Marx Brothers, nor, in the court's opinion,
could the play be privileged as entertainment or as satire, parody or
burlesqueSM The refusal to extend first amendment protection to A
Night in Hollywood was based on the court's view that the Ukraine
segment of the play conveyed no ideas and was nothing more than a
skillful imitation of the Marx Brothers' performances.389 Quoting
from Estate of Elvis Presley, the court declared: "Although en-
tertainment can merit first amendment protection, entertainment
that merely imitates 'even if skillfully and accurately carried out,
does not really have its own creative component and does not have a
significant value as pure entertainment.' "390 The defendants con-
tended that the play was a parody of the Marx Brothers' perform-
ance and a comment "about 1930's Hollywood, its techniques, its
stars and its excesses."3 91 Generally speaking, parody, satire and
burlesque are regarded as forms of literary or social criticism and,
consequently, are considered protected forms of expression. 9' How-
ever, while the commentator or parodist is entitled to make use of
another's work in order to create a larger presentation,3 93 he cannot
merely imitate another's work without making his own creative con-
tribution. In Groucho Marx Productions, the court found that any
literary commentary intended by the author was substantially over-
shadowed by the wholesale appropriation of the Marx Brothers'
characters.3 " Accordingly, the court concluded that the play was not
privileged and that the defendants had infringed upon the plaintiff's
right of publicity. 895
388. Id. at 492-93.
389. Id. at 492.
390. Id. at 493 (quoting Presley, 513 F. Supp. at 1359).
391. 523 F. Supp. at 493.
392. Id. at 493. See generally Goetsch, Parody as Free Speech - The Replacement of
the Fair Use Doctrine by First Amendment Protection, 3 W. NEw ENGLAND L. REV. 39
(1980); Netterville, note 274 supra; Comment, Parody, Copyrights, and the First Amend-
ment. 10 U.S.F.L. REV. 564 (1976).
393. Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 623 F.2d 252, 253 (2d Cir.
1980). See also 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §§ 13.05[B], [Cl (1979).
394. 523 F. Supp. at 493.
395. Id. The district court's decision in Groucho Marx was reversed by the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit on September 10, 1982. 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982). The
court concluded that the decendibility of the Marx Brothers' rights of publicity was governed
by California law rather than New York law and that publicity rights did not survive death in
California. Id. at 318. Consequently, the court did not have to decide whether the play was
protected expression as a literary work. The case, however, was remanded to the district court
to consider the plaintiff's claims for false representation in violation of § 43 (a) of the Lanham
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976), and claims under state law for misappropriation, interfer-
ence with contractual relations, unfair competition, and infringement of common law copy-
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The court reached a similar conclusion in Estate of Presley v.
Russen, 96 a case which involved an Elvis Presley impersonator.
While conceding that the defendant's impersonation was entertain-
ing and perhaps marginally informational in that it illustrated a per-
formance of a legendary figure in the entertainment industry, the
court nevertheless found that it was essentially an imitation, rather
than a parody, burlesque or other critical commentary on Presley or
his music.3 7 Thus, in the court's opinion, the primary objective of
the show was to exploit the Presley image without contributing any-
thing of substantial value in return. 98
Although the Marx Brothers and Russen decisions are similar,
the defendant's position on the parody issue seems to have been
stronger in the former case. While the performer in Russen did noth-
ing to place his imitation of Elvis Presley in some sort of broader
context, a great deal of creative effort went into the production of
Day and Night. The plot and dialogue were original, evoking, rather
than slavishly copying, the Marx Brothers' unique style of humor.
Furthermore, the "Ukraine" sketch did not stand alone, but was part
of a larger scheme. Apparently, the Ukraine portion expanded upon
the themes and ideas that had been introduced in the earlier
"Hollywood" segment of the play. If this is correct, the Marx Broth-
ers' impersonation, as the defendants maintained, might have been a
legitimate device for communicating the play's overall message.399
4. Advertising and Memorabilia
Advertising and other commercial uses are inherently exploi-
tive-they convey neither information nor ideas, instead they derive
their appeal from the commercial value of the particular celebrity's
name, likeness or other attribute.0 0 It is this utter dependence upon
the celebrity's persona and the absence of socially valuable purposes
in first amendment terms,401 rather than the commercial use per se,
right. Id. at 323.
396. 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1980).
397. Id. at 1358-59.
398. Id. at 1359.
399. The court's characterization of the "Ukraine" portion of the play as imitation rather
than as social or literary criticism is reminiscent of the Gaslight decision, in which Jack
Benny's spoof of Gaslight was held to constitute copyright infringement. Loew's Inc. v. Colum-
bia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955), affd sub nom., Benny v.
Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), affid by an equally divided court, 356 U.S. 43
(1958).
400. See Note, note 194 supra, at 769.
401. The United States Supreme Court has declared that commercial speech is entitled to
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which renders portrayals in this area more vulnerable to liability.""'
Since advertising is normally considered a commercial use,
courts are often willing to impose liability under either publicity or
appropriation theories when a person's name or likeness is used with-
out authorization for advertising purposes.4 0 An exception will
sometimes be made, however, when factual information is conveyed
about the product and no endorsement is suggested by use of the
plaintiff's name or likeness. For example, in Rand v. Hearst
Corp.,04 " the court refused to find liability when the defendant
placed on the cover of a book, Chaos Below Heaven, by Eugene
Vale, an excerpt from a critical review which declared that "Ayn
Rand Enjoys. . .the Same Kind of Mystique Analysis as Vale...
Their Underlying Drive is the Same." The court held that the first
amendment protected publication of comments about an author's
style and concluded that Ayn Rand's right to control the use of her
name did not outweigh the defendant's right to reprint the review in
an effort to inform the public of the nature of the book by comparing
it to the works of another author.4 0'
A similar result was reached in Booth v. Curtis Publishing
Co.,4 °6 where the defendant published a picture of Shirley Booth in
Holiday Magazine. The magazine did a feature story on the Round
Hill resort in the British West Indies and used the plaintiff as an
example of the many prominent guests at the hotel. Since this was
clearly newsworthy, the plaintiff did not object, but she did bring
suit when the defendant published the same photograph in a sub-
scription advertisement for Holiday in other magazines. Since the
advertisements expressly presented the plaintiff's photograph as a
some protection under the first amendment, though not as much as noncommercial speech. See
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 435 U.S. 490 (1981); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 363-65
(1977); Linmark Assoc's v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 91-92 (1977); Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 759-60
(1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975).
402. See Felcher & Rubin, note 12 supra, at 1606.
403. See, e.g., Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 Ill. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952)
(plaintiff's photograph used to promote dog food); Pallas v Crowley, Milner & Co., 322 Mich.
411, 417, 33 N.W.2d 911, 914 (1948) (plaintiff's photograph used in cosmetics advertise-
ment); Loftus v. Greenwich Lithographing Co., 192 A.D. 251, 254-56, 182 N.Y.S. 428, 431-
32 (1920) (picture of plaintiff in distinctive costume used to advertise movie). See also
Gordon, Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55 Nw. U.L. Rv.
553, 557-69 (1960).
404. 31 A.D. 2d 406, 298 N.Y.S.2d 405 (1969).
405. Id. at 414, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 412.
406. 15 A.D.2d 343, 223 N.Y.S.2d 737, affd, 11 N.Y.2d 907, 182 N.E.2d 812, 228
N.Y.S.2d 468 (1962).
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sample of Holiday's contents, the court determined that it was
merely incidental use and not collateral advertising. Therefore, re-
covery was denied.'0
The same conclusion was reached in Namath v. Sports Illus-
trated.'°' Photographs of Namath which appeared in 1969 in Sports
Illustrated in connection with the New York Jets Super Bowl vic-
tory, were used several years later in advertisements to promote sub-
scriptions. The court, relying on the Booth case, found the use to be
outside the scope of the New York statute.409 This result seems in-
correct, however, since the advertisements, which were placed in
other magazines, used expressions like "How to get Close to Joe
Namath" and "The man you love loves Joe Namath." This went
beyond merely using the photographs as an example of the maga-
zine's format and content; it involved conscious exploitation of the
goodwill associated with Namath's identity to promote magazine
subscriptions.
Of course, advertising is not the only way in which a celebrity's
recognition values can be put to a commercial use. Placing his name
or likeness on posters, clothing or other articles is another common
form of commercial exploitation. Since these are not conventional
media for the communication of ideas, one would expect first amend-
ment protection to be denied in most instances. This is precisely
what happened in Factors 1,410 where the assignee of Elvis Presley's
publicity rights sought to enjoin the defendant, Pro Arts, from sell-
ing Elvis Presley posters. The defendant, relying on Paulsen v. Per-
sonality Posters,'" contended that publication of the Presley memo-
rial poster commemorated a newsworthy event, the death of the
singer, and therefore should have been regarded as a form of pro-
tected speech. 1 In Paulsen, comedian Pat Paulsen, who was run-
ning a mock campaign for President, sued under the New York pri-
vacy statute to prevent the defendant from selling Pat Paulsen
campaign posters.' 1 3 Recovery was denied on the theory that Paul-
sen's presidential campaign was a newsworthy event and that the
407. Id. at 350, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 744.
408. 80 Misc. 2d 531, 363 N.Y.2d 276, affd, 48 A.D.2d 487, 371 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1975),
afd, 39 N.Y.2d 897, 352 N.E.2d 584, 386 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1976).
409. Id. at 534-35, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 280.
410. 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
411. 59 Misc. 2d 444, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (1968).
412. 579 F.2d at 222.
413. The plaintiff was depicted on the poster with a banner marked "1968" across his
chest. The words "For President" appeared at the bottom. 59 Misc. 2d at 445, 299 N.Y.S.2d
at 503.
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defendant's poster was merely a form of comment about it."1 ' The
court in Factors I, however, rejected the defendant's argument, hold-
ing that the Paulsen case was inapplicable. 415 Accordingly, it con-
cluded that Elvis Presley posters were not protected speech and that
their sale by the defendant infringed upon the plaintiff's right of
publicity.
416
The Factors I court was correct in rejecting Paulsen as control-
ling authority in a publicity case.1 Paulsen's mock presidential
campaign was a satiric comment on the American political process,
and therefore, he could hardly object if others took his idea a step
further. In contrast, the Elvis Presley poster in Factors carried no
social or political message. It was a blatant attempt to capitalize
upon the public interest in Presley, which had arisen as the result of
his death.
A second case, Current Audio, Inc. v. RCA Corp.,418 also in-
volved Elvis Presley. RCA had an exclusive right to manufacture
and sell recordings of Elvis Presley songs as well as the sole right to
use the singer's name and likeness in order to advertise its Presley
recordings. The cover of Current Audio magazine depicted Elvis
Presley at a recent press conference. Inside the magazine was a
stereo record which included a two and one-half minute excerpt from
the press conference. RCA brought suit against the magazine, alleg-
ing that Current Audio had infringed upon publicity rights assigned
to it by Presley. Current Audio was a "mixed medium" publication
which contained both written material in a conventional magazine
format and a stereo record. The written segment of the magazine
contained articles about Elvis Presley, Mick Jagger, Senator Edward
Kennedy, Angela Davis and Charles Manson. The record, which had
a total playing time of about 45 minutes, contained interviews and
414. Id. at 449-50, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 507-08.
415. The Paulsen case has been confined to its facts according to subsequent New York
decisions. See Rosemont Enters. Inc. v. Urban Sys., Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 788, 790-91, 340
N.Y.S.2d 144, 146, affd as modified, 42 A.D.2d 544, 345 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1973).
416. 579 F.2d at 222.
417. It should also be noted that Paulsen brought his action under the New York privacy
statute. The court observed'that since Paulsen had already licensed a company to sell buttons,
stickers, and posters in connection with his mock political campaign, he could hardly claim the
sort of mental anguish that traditionally was required in privacy actions. 59 Misc. 2d at 446,
451, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 504, 508. The court's refusal in Paulsen to acknowledge the economic
nature of the plaintiff's injury which was reminiscent of O'Brien and Gautier, has been
criticised by a student commentator. See Note, note 132 supra, at 555. In fairness to the
court, however, it did discuss publicity rights and concluded that, as in the case of privacy,
Paulsen's publicity interest would have to yield to the first amendment policy of encouraging
political debate. 59 Misc. 2d at 450-51, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 508-09.
418. 71 Misc. 2d 831, 337 N.Y.S.2d 949 (1972).
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comments by and about each of the topics or persons featured in the
written sections of the magazine. Denying RCA's request for a tem-
porary injunction, the court in Current Audio held that the right of
publicity had no application to the use of a picture or name in con-
nection with the dissemination of news and publications in the public
interest, notwithstanding that such activities were carried on for a
profit. 1" According to the court, the Elvis Presley press conference
was a noteworthy event, and, therefore, accounts of it were entitled
to the first amendment protection. 2 0 RCA contended that even if a
report of the press conference was privileged, the recording in Cur-
rent Audio was nothing more than a "commodity" and deserved no
more protection than products like bubble gum. The court, however,
noted the trend toward progressively expanding the ambit of protec-
tion to cover new forms of communication. Consequently, it con-
cluded that the recording, like radio, television or a motion picture,
was a suitable medium for the dissemination of thoughts, ideas and
information about newsworthy events and matters of public con-
cern."'" According to the court, the nature of the medium was not
important as long as it had the capacity to disseminate ideas and
information. 2
If one views Current Audio magazine as a "hybrid medium"
consisting of both a magazine and a recording which together com-
municate ideas and information about newsworthy subjects, it is
then possible to distinguish the Current Audio case from Haelan
Laboratories42 ,8 and Grant.42 4 Unlike Haelan Laboratories, where
the baseball players' recognition values were being exploited to pro-
mote the sale of a collateral product, bubble gum, the recording was
not used to sell the magazine, but was part of the magazine's me-
dium of communication. The situation in Current Audio can also be
distinguished from that in Grant because the subject matter in the
recording was directly related to the material in the magazine. In
Grant, Cary Grant's picture was used to illustrate an article on
men's fashions. Liability was imposed because Grant had no connec-
419. Id. at 835, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 954.
420. Id. at 834, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 953.
421. Id. at 836, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 955.
422. Id. The court also observed that Presley was in no way "performing" at the press
conference. The spontaneous give and take of an unrehearsed press conference was in the
court's opinion of a wholly different character than the performance of a musical or artistic
work. Id. at 834, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 953.
423. Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.).
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
424. Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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tion with the material in the article. It is probably fair to say, how-
ever, that Current Audio, like the Paulsen case discussed earlier, re-
flects a rather unusual factual situation. Consequently, the court's
holding in that case is unlikely to be broadly applied in other public-
ity cases.
B. A "Fair Use" Analysis
A wide range of activities such as advertising, impersonation,
publication of fictional or biographical works, and the manufacture
of souvenir merchandise or memorabilia, give rise to potential con-
flicts between publicity rights and the first amendment. For the most
part, there is general agreement at each end of the spectrum: factual
accounts of newsworthy events or matters of public interest are privi-
leged, 4 5 while advertising or promotional uses are not.42  In the first
instance the information content of the defendant's use is high, while
in the second example it is not. The problem remains as to what to
do about uses which fall between the extremes-those which inci-
dentally disseminate ideas or information or which have some mini-
mal element of creativity or artistic merit, but whose primary pur-
pose is to entertain or amuse. Impersonations of entertainers, filmed
recordings of actual performances or events, and perhaps board
games fall into this category.
The following approach is suggested as a means of distinguish-
ing between permitted uses of a celebrity's performance and recogni-
tion values and those which infringe upon his right of publicity.
First, the use in question must have at least some intellectual or cre-
ative content. This threshold requirement reflects the underlying pur-
poses of the first amendment-the protection of ideas. Once this
threshold requirement is met, one must determine whether the de-
fendant's use substantially impairs the existing or potential value of
the plaintiff's publicity rights. The concept of fair use, as associated
with the law of copyright, is a useful analytical tool for making such
a determination.4 2 7
425. See, e.g., Ann-Margret v. High Society Magazine, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); Frosch v. Gosset & Dunlap, 75 A.D.2d 768, 427 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1980); Cohn v. Na-
tional Broadcasting Co., 67 A.D.2d 140, 414 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1979); Rosemont Enters., Inc. v.
Random House, 58 Misc. 2d 1, 294 N.Y.S.2d 122 (Sup. Ct. 1968), a fid, 32 A.D. 2d 892, 301
N.Y.S.2d 948 (1969).
426. See, e.g., Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Factors 1, 579
F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978). cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
427. See Note, note 99 supra, at 1206-08. See also Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F.
Supp. 1339, 1358 n.18 (D.N.J. 1981).
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Fair use is a privilege which allows others to use copyrighted
material in a reasonable manner without the need to obtain the con-
sent of the copyright owner.""' It reflects the notion that society
should enjoy free access to copyrighted materials as long as the cop-
yright holder's right to exploit his copyright interest is not seriously
impaired. In this manner the fair use doctrine seeks to support the
constitutional policy of promoting the "progress of science and useful
arts" by preventing the copyright monopoly from stifling the very
creative forces it was intended to foster."
Procedurally, fair use is employed as a privilege or defense to a
copyright infringement claim. In determining whether to treat the
defendant's action as a fair use in a copyright infringement suit the
court generally considers three factors: the purpose and character of
the use; the amount and substantiality of the portion used; and the
degree to which the defendant's use may prejudice the sale, diminish
the profits, or supersede the objects of the original work.' 0
The purpose and character of the offending publication is often
a significant factor in determining whether or not it should be
deemed a fair use. Thus, criticism, comment, news reporting, teach-
ing, scholarship or research are generally treated as fair uses431 while
ordinary commercial uses are seldom protected. 4 2 The amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole is another consideration.48  The effect of the infringing
use upon the potential market for, or value of, the copyrighted work
428. See, e.g.. Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co., 181 F.2d 644, 666
(7th Cir. 1950); Holdredge v. Knight Publishing Corp., 214 F. Supp. 921, 924 (S.D. Cal.
1963).
429. Iowa State Univ. Research Found,, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 621 F.2d 57,
60 (2d Cir. 1980).
430. See Mathews Conveyer Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73, 85 (6th Cir. 1943).
431. See Italian Book Corp. v. American Broadcasting Co., 458 F. Supp. 65, 70-71
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (television news broadcast of parade where copyrighted music was per-
formed); Keep Thomson Governor Comm. v. Citizens For Gallen Comm., 457 F. Supp. 957,
961 (D.N.H. 1978) (political commercial); Norman v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 333
F. Supp. 788, 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (television drama about life of Ezra Pound). But see Wih-
tol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777, 780-81(8th Cir. 1962) (photocopying of musical score for educa-
tional purposes not a fair use).
432. See Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302, 304 (E.D.
Pa. 1938) (verbatim use of material from plaintiffs textbook in cigarette advertisement not a
fair use).
433. The question is whether the material used constitutes a substantial portion of the
plaintiffs, not the defendant's, work. Although the quantitative relation of this material to
plaintiff's entire work is relevant, the qualitative aspects may be even more important. Thus,
appropriating even a small amount of the plaintiffs material may exceed the bounds of fair
use if the portion taken is qualitatively significant. 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
13.05[A], at 13-61 (1979).
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is perhaps the most important item to be weighed in determining fair
use. This not only involves consideration of the injury to the plaintiff
from the particular activity complained of, but also whether un-
restricted and widespread conduct similar to that of the defendant
would adversely affect the plaintiff's market.''
Section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act enumerates some of the
situations where fair use may be found.43 ' The statutory definition
also incorporates a test which determines fair use by examining the
nature or function of the use rather than merely focusing on the sim-
ilarity between the copyrighted work and the defendant's product.
According to this function test, if both the plaintiff's and the defen-
dant's works are used for the same purpose, the defense of fair use
will not be allowed. However, regardless of medium, if the defen-
dant's work performs a different function from that of the plaintiff's
work, the defense of fair use may be applicable even though the
works contain substantially similar material.4'3  Thus, satire or par-
ody is usually regarded as a fair use since it serves a different func-
tion-social commentary or literary criticism of the work upon
which it is based.4s7 Similarly, conventional reviews, comments and
criticisms of copyrighted material serve a different purpose than the
original. M
434. Sid & Marty Kroftt Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1169 n.13 (9th Cir. 1977).
435. Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976 provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work,
including such use by reproduction of copies or phonorecords or by any other
means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use
made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered
shall include -
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. V 1981).
436. See, e.g., Mura v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. Inc., 245 F. Supp. 587, 590
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (use of plaintiffs hand puppets on children's television program was a fair
use).
437. See, e.g.. Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1964) (lyrics
of Irving Berlin songs parodied in Mad Magazine held not substantial taking); Elsmere Music,
Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741, 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd, 623 F.2d
252 (2d Cir. 1980) (the song I Love Sodom held to be a parody of I Love New York).
438. See Italian Book Corp. v. American Broadcasting Co., 485 F. Supp. 65, 70
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (television news broadcast). See also Consumers Union of United States,
Inc. v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 189 F. Supp. 275, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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Using the same rationale, the fair use defense should be allowed
in incidental use cases where quotations from song lyrics or similar
copyrighted material are used to evoke the atmosphere of a particu-
lar time or place.4 89 Reproduction of an entire copyrighted piece,
however, even when there is no similarity of function, will not be
regarded as a fair use." 0 By incorporating all or substantially all of
the copied work, the distinction of function vanishes since verbatim
reproduction will serve the function of the plaintiff's work as well as
that of the defendant's.
4 1
Applying the function test to some of the cases reviewed earlier
leads to some interesting conclusions. As one might expect, the ap-
proach works especially well where performance rights are involved.
In Zacchini,44a for example, even though the defendant's purpose,
dissemination of information, was different from that of the plaintiff,
entertainment, the newscast of Zacchini's entire act arguably served
the same function as far as audience needs were concerned. If only a
portion of Zacchini's performance had been used, however, the
broadcaster's case would have been much stronger. The purpose of
the use would still have been different, but if only a small portion
had been used, the defendant could have plausibly contended that
audience interest in the performance itself would not have been
diminished.
This analysis is also useful when the plaintiff is impersonated
for entertainment purposes. Where the defendant simulates the
plaintiff's "act" or performing style his imitation lessens the demand
for future performances by the plaintiff. Where the sole purpose of
the impersonation is to provide entertainment, it serves the same
purpose as similar performances by the plaintiff and, therefore,
should not be privileged. 443 However, when the plaintiff is dead or no
longer professionally active, impersonations obviously cannot impair
439. See Broadway Music Corp. v. F-R Publishing Corp., 31 F. Supp. 817, 818
(S.D.N.Y. 1940) (publication of portion of song associated with actress in connection with
magazine article about death of actress held a fair use).
440. Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777, 780-81 (8th Cir. 1962) (photocopying of musical
score for educational purposes not a fair use); Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484,
486-87 (9th Cir. 1937) (use of data in plaintiff's telephone directory by publisher of rival
directory not a fair use); Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 346 F. Supp. 376, 384-85
(D.C. Conn. 1972) (performance of Jesus Christ Superstar by religious group not a fair use).
441. 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[D], at 13-72.1 (1977).
442. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
443. Impersonation of the plaintiff for entertainment purposes should be distinguished
from impersonation in commercials. In the latter situation, where the purpose is to sell a col-
lateral product, the defendant's use usually will be regarded as commercial use because it does
not communicate ideas or information.
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the market for future live performances by the plaintiff and, there-
fore, only the economic value of past recorded performances would
be affected. Where the recorded performances-movies, records,
videotape, etc.-are copyrighted, the plaintiff will be required to
base his case on copyright infringement, thus allowing the defendant
to raise the fair use issue.444 This author contends that the same
principle should be applied when the plaintiff bases his action on in-
terference with publicity rights instead of copyright infringement. 45
The function test admittedly does not fare as well when other
types of recognition values are appropriated by the defendant. The
test is better suited to situations where the defendant's use can be
compared with that of the plaintiff in order to determine if they both
serve the same function in the market place. In the case of perform-
ances or impersonations, the defendant's product can be compared
with the plaintiff's. When the defendant merely appropriates the
plaintiff's persona, however, a comparison is more difficult because of
the intangible nature of the plaintiff's interest. Therefore, instead of
comparing the defendant's infringing use with a specific work of the
plaintiff, the court must inquire as to whether the offending use in-
terferes with the plaintiff's ability to exploit his recognition values in
some traditional manner. This involves a consideration of both the
nature and purpose of the defendant's use as well as its impact on
the market for the plaintiff's persona. The policy behind this ap-
proach is the same one that underlies the fair use doctrine; that is,
free expression should only be restricted when the plaintiff's eco-
nomic interests are directly threatened.44' To some degree, the policy
also reflects the unfair competition aspects of the right of publicity.
Since recognition values are usually exploited either by advertising
or by the sale of posters and other memorabilia, comparable uses by
others should generally be regarded as improper."2 Conversely, ac-
444. If the recorded performances were not copyrighted, the plaintiff might invoke the
concept of common law copyright; however, the fair use doctrine may perhaps also apply to
common law copyright. Cf. Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 244
N.E.2d 250, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1968).
445. Of course, it might make a difference whether the defendant's impersonation is live
or on film. A court might conclude that a filmed impersonation might impair the market for
filmed performances of the plaintiff, while finding a dissimilarity of function with respect to a
live performance by the defendant.
446. Felcher and Rubin have reached a similar conclusion by arguing that media portray-
als of celebrities must cause identifiable harm before relief is granted. Felcher & Rubin, note
12 supra. at 1608-16.
447. Thus, for example, baseball cards, which contain information about the players,
might be regarded as commercial when they are used to promote the sale of a collateral prod-
uct, even though the same pictures and information might be treated as a fair use when merely
placed in a book or magazine about baseball.
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tivities such as use of the plaintiffs name or likeness in news ac-
counts, fictional works, or educational works, which do not interfere
with the celebrity's market for advertising or memorabilia, should
ordinarily qualify as legitimate uses. Similarly, use of the plaintiff's
likeness in original works of art, such as paintings or statues, should
be privileged since recognition values are not typically exploited in
this manner. Mass-produced objects, such as posters or the statuettes
involved in Memphis Development, however, are conventionally re-
garded as commercial exploitation and, as such, directly compete
with the celebrity's efforts to capitalize upon his recognition values
by marketing similar products.
Board games, such as those involved in the Uhlaender4" and
Palmer"9 cases, are more difficult to evaluate. Although these games
no doubt communicate information, their avowed purpose is to enter-
tain. In that sense they are distinguishable from newspapers and
magazines, where the informational function is primary rather than
merely incidental. 45 0 Unlike Haelan Laboratories,"1 however, which
involved bubble gum cards, the plaintiffs recognition values are not
being used to sell a collateral product. Therefore, one might contend
that the defendant's use is analogous to the incidental use concept in
copyright law, permissible as long as player names are simply used
to make the game more realistic. In a close case, the issue may turn
on whether publicity values are customarily exploited in this particu-
lar medium. Thus, as in the Uhlaender case, where the plaintiff and
others have already transferred their publicity rights for this pur-
pose, the court might conclude that the defendant's use of his name
and likeness should not be allowed.
The interface between first amendment values and publicity
rights is a complex one. It is obvious, therefore, that no single con-
cept can resolve every clash between the social commitment to free
expression and the economic interests of performers and celebrities.
However, the function test appears to be a useful analytical tool for
courts to use in their search for an alternative solution to these
conflicts.
448. 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970).
449. 96 N.J. Super. 72, 232 A.2d 458 (Ch. Div. 1967).
450. For a contrary view, see Treece, note 3 supra, at 666-68.
451. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
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CONCLUSION
After almost thirty years, the law of publicity still resembles a
"haystack in a hurricane"45 ' and shows no sign of settling down in
the near future. Indeed, each new case seems to raise additional
problems instead of providing answers to existing ones. In view of
this rather discouraging outlook, one might question whether the
right of publicity is a useful concept. After making allowances for
the restrictions imposed on the right of publicity by federal copyright
law and the first amendment, does anything remain which could not
be nestled comfortably under the theory of unfair competition?
In this author's opinion, the right of publicity can be a helpful
theory for protecting performance and, particularly, recognition val-
ues. Analytically, the right of publicity could be classified as a form
of unfair competition. Although it goes beyond the scope of the
traditional passing off theory, the right of publicity does strongly re-
semble the misappropriation doctrine. Nevertheless, it is better to
treat the right of publicity as distinct from misappropriation. The
misappropriation doctrine is a somewhat discredited concept which
has been expressly rejected in a number of jurisdictions. Rather than
foreclosing the possibility of protecting publicity rights in those
states, the preferable course of action is to disclaim any association
with misappropriation, and allow the right of publicity to rest on its
own bottom. Another advantage of distinguishing the right of public-
ity from other forms of unfair competition is that it allows one to
emphasize the assignable and descendible nature of the right.
Notwithstanding the conceptual utility of publicity rights, there
are serious problems associated with this doctrine that must eventu-
ally be resolved. Perhaps the most urgent problem is the survivability
issue. From the celebrity's viewpoint, one of the most significant ad-
vantages of the right of publicity over privacy actions and conven-
tional forms of unfair competition is the prospect that the right will
survive death and, therefore, serve as a mechanism for benefitting"
one's family. For this reason, some post mortem protection of public-
ity values is justified, but only if reasonable limits are placed on the
duration of such rights. To date, the courts have not effectively re-
sponded to this concern and in all probability a legislative solution
will eventually become necessary.
Given the nature of the market in which publicity rights oper-
ate, the lack of uniformity among the states with respect to the na-
452. Etore, 299 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir. 1955).
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ture, scope and duration of publicity rights represents another seri-
ous problem. One solution is to reduce the importance of publicity
rights by deciding that they have been drastically restricted by the
preemption provisions of the 1976 Copyright Act. Although the lan-
guage of section 301 does not support such an approach, some sort of
federal legislative intervention in this area may be necessary to pro-
vide an element of uniformity to the law of publicity so that it does
not impose an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce.
Finally, more attention needs to be given to the conflict between
publicity rights and first amendment considerations. The concepts
that have traditionally been employed for this purpose in appropria-
tion cases are helpful; in addition, the function test, derived from the
fair use doctrine of copyright law, is another useful concept.
Hopefully, solutions will eventually be found to many of the
problems that have been discussed in this article. In the meantime,
the right of publicity will no doubt continue to challenge the ingenu-
ity of judges and scholars.
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